Yuexing Hao
Publications
UXBench: Measuring the Actionability of LLM-Generated UX Critiques
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as UX judges that inspect interfaces, diagnose usability problems, and propose repairs. Yet no controlled benchmark measures whether the resulting critiques are reliable and actionable across heterogeneous product surfaces. We introduce UXBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLMs as interaction-grounded UX judges. UXBench comprises local-first runnable web fixtures spanning ten product-surface families, paired with coverage-gated browser exploration that forces models to collect interaction evidence before reporting. Each judge model produces a structured UX report over seven rubric dimensions; report quality is measured by whether a fixed downstream repair agent can improve the interface based on the critique. We evaluate eight frontier models under both an automated repair-lift protocol and a blind human validation study. Results show that UX judging is neither saturated nor one dimensional: models differ meaningfully in report actionability, exhibit distinct rubric-level repair signatures, vary in fixture-level reliability, and trade leadership across surface categories
Chain of Risk: Safety Failures in Large Reasoning Models and Mitigation via Adaptive Multi-Principle Steering
Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.