Jiawei Liu
Publications
LemonHarness Technical Report
As large language model (LLM) agents are applied to longer tasks, they increasingly modify workspace state across multiple rounds of iteration. However, agents typically observe only tool outputs and log fragments, while the actual state changes occur in the file system. Without explicit workspace boundaries, state-changing operations such as file writes and temporary artifact generation may scatter changes across paths. Over time, these weakly constrained changes accumulate, making states such as modified files difficult to track. This paper presents LemonHarness, an integrated execution framework for long-horizon agents. LemonHarness establishes an explicit execution boundary by constraining state-changing operations within a clearly defined workspace and bringing model invocation, tool execution, and rule knowledge within a single controlled boundary. State-changing operations, including file writes, dependency installation, and temporary artifact creation, are executed through structured tool interfaces, with execution feedback recorded as observations available to subsequent model decisions. The system also introduces a reusable rule knowledge base, which turns recurring execution rules and acceptance criteria into runtime knowledge. LemonHarness further adds a time-aware execution mechanism that exposes elapsed and remaining budget to the model, so it can rebalance exploration, implementation, and validation effort as time pressure shifts and avoid timeouts from long waits or excessive verification. On Terminal-Bench 2.0, LemonHarness_GPT-5.3-CodeX reached 84.49% accuracy over 445 trials; pairing the same framework with the stronger GPT-5.5 backbone raised the average accuracy to 86.52% across five jobs. The results suggest that a unified runtime boundary, callable rule knowledge, and time-aware execution can improve the stability of long-horizon agent execution.
Agentic Electronic Design Automation: A Handoff Perspective
Electronic design automation (EDA) is inherently multi-stage and handoff-heavy. Design artifacts, flow scripts, and engineering decisions cross tool, session, and organizational boundaries before final implementation, signoff, or release. Each transfer carries explicit and implicit requirements that may not be fully captured by stage-local checks. LLM-based agents now invoke EDA tools directly, embed retrieved knowledge in executable scripts, and hand off state across sessions and stages. Once their outputs condition downstream engineering decisions, the transferred object must satisfy a handoff contract and meet the assumptions of its next consumer. This survey introduces handoff validity as its organizing principle. A handoff is valid when the transferred object satisfies the consumer's acceptance conditions and carries sufficient context, evidence, and provenance for downstream use. We review 82 systems and classify them into three boundary classes. Stage-Bound systems establish validity within a single EDA stage or bounded verification task. Flow-Bound systems preserve coherent workflow state across tools, invocations, and sessions. Organization-Bound systems maintain source grounding, provenance, scope, and admissibility across knowledge and authority boundaries. For each class, we analyze handoff contracts, handoff objects, coordination mechanisms, and open questions. These analyses motivate a five-layer EDA agent communication protocol (EACP), covering the agent discovery, agent message, tool invocation, workflow orchestration, and security and IP protocols. We aim to provide a common vocabulary and research agenda for trustworthy agentic EDA.
Teach-and-Repeat: Accurately Extracting Operational Knowledge from Mobile Screen Demonstrations to Empower GUI Agents
Understanding the digital world on mobile devices is shifting from static UI perception to dynamic action comprehension. This capability enables models to convert visual state transitions into operational knowledge, defined as short natural-language sentences that describe action types, target UI elements, textual arguments, and execution orders. However, due to the highly diverse and heterogeneous UI designs across applications, existing vision-language models (VLMs) struggle to accurately infer these underlying operations. To bridge this gap, we introduce Teach VLM, a core model designed to translate mobile screen trajectories into step-wise operational knowledge by extracting and analyzing operation-related keyframes from demonstration videos. To address the scarcity of aligned training data, we develop a systematic data flywheel for scalable data acquisition. We further introduce a novel Chinese Mobile Screen Teach Benchmark for fine-grained evaluation. Building upon Teach VLM, we propose the Teach-and-Repeat paradigm, where the generated operational knowledge serves as an interpretable procedural reference to guide downstream screen-based execution agents. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that Teach VLM significantly outperforms strong VLM baselines, achieving state-of-the-art performance in operation semantics prediction. Furthermore, experiments in Android World show that our paradigm yields consistent Task Success Rate improvements for downstream agents. Together, Teach VLM and the Teach-and-Repeat paradigm offer a practical pathway from raw demonstrations to reusable task automation.
AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools and retrieval systems to autonomously complete complex tasks. However, this design exposes agents to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where attacker-controlled context embedded in tool outputs or retrieved content silently steers agent actions away from user intent. Unlike prompt-based attacks, IPI unfolds over multi-turn trajectories, making malicious control difficult to disentangle from legitimate task execution. Existing inference-time defenses primarily rely on heuristic detection and conservative blocking of high-risk actions, which can prematurely terminate workflows or broadly suppress tool usage under ambiguous multi-turn scenarios. We propose AgentSentry, a novel inference-time detection and mitigation framework for tool-augmented LLM agents. To the best of our knowledge, AgentSentry is the first inference-time defense to model multi-turn IPI as a temporal causal takeover. It localizes takeover points via controlled counterfactual re-executions at tool-return boundaries and enables safe continuation through causally guided context purification that removes attack-induced deviations while preserving task-relevant evidence. We evaluate AgentSentry on the \textsc{AgentDojo} benchmark across four task suites, three IPI attack families, and multiple black-box LLMs. AgentSentry eliminates successful attacks and maintains strong utility under attack, achieving an average Utility Under Attack (UA) of 74.55 %, improving UA by 20.8 to 33.6 percentage points over the strongest baselines without degrading benign performance.