Zehao Lin
Publications
Metis: Memory Foundation Model
Recent advances in AI agents have increasingly internalized native capabilities into their underlying foundation models, giving rise to multimodal foundation models and large reasoning models. However, agent memory is still primarily implemented through external modules, leaving the native memory capability largely unexplored. In this paper, we take a first step toward this direction by introducing memory foundation models, which empower foundation models with native memory capabilities. We formalize native memory from two perspectives: a persistent and dynamically evolving memory state within the backbone, and native memory procedures that autonomously store and utilize information through model computation. We show that native memory offers advantages in architecture, end-to-end optimization, and efficiency. Based on this formulation, we propose Metis, the first prototype of memory foundation models. Metis introduces a new architecture that equips a foundation model with a native memory state, allowing historical information to be compressed into the model and accessed through memory attention. We construct large-scale memory-specific training data and introduce multiple optimization objectives to acquire these native memory procedures through mid-training. The online memory maintenance of Metis is gradient-free, and the memory update requires only a forward pass. At inference time, all learned model weights remain frozen, while the native memory states are autonomously transformed through standard forward computation. Through extensive experiments, we show that Metis exhibits native memory capabilities and further provide a detailed analysis of its strengths, limitations, and behaviors. To facilitate future research on memory foundation models, we release our project and model checkpoints.
MemOps: Benchmarking Lifecycle Memory Operations in Long-Horizon Conversations
Long-term memory has become a foundational capability for LLM-based agents that accompany users across extended, multi-session interactions. Existing benchmarks, however, evaluate such memory almost exclusively through downstream question answering, scoring only the correctness of a final answer. This black-box formulation conflates the heterogeneous causes of memory failure, such as missing the introduction of a relevant fact, binding an operation to the wrong target, or relying on stale values after a correction. As a result, it can credit correct answers despite their reliance on inconsistent or unsafe memory states. In this paper, we argue that, in dynamic long-horizon interactions, memory is not a static collection of facts but a lifecycle of explicit operations, including remembering, forgetting, updating, reflecting, and their compositions. We introduce MemOps, a benchmark that reformulates conversational memory as a sequence of lifecycle operations and represents each memory event with a structured trace specifying its trigger, target, scope, state transition, and supporting evidence. A controllable generation pipeline embeds these operations into long, task-oriented conversations and produces gold operation traces together with six categories of operation-level probes, evaluated under both adjacent-evidence and long-context settings. Across long-context, retrieval-based, parametric and managed-memory systems, MemOps disentangles failure modes that final-answer accuracy alone conceals, revealing that current systems remain far from uniformly reliable. For instance, session-level retrieval outperforms turn-level retrieval, and long-context models remain notably weak at reconstructing ordered memory-state trajectories. These results move long-term memory evaluation from final-answer scoring toward interpretable, operation-level diagnosis.
A Survey on the Security of Long-Term Memory in LLM Agents: Toward Mnemonic Sovereignty
Research on large language model (LLM) security is shifting from "will the model leak training data" to a more consequential question: can an agent with persistent, long-term memory be continuously shaped, cross-session poisoned, accessed without authorization, and propagated across shared organizational state? Recent surveys cover memory architectures and agent mechanisms, but fewer center the epistemic and governance properties of persistent, writable memory as the reason memory is an independent security problem. This survey addresses that gap. Drawing on cognitive neuroscience and the philosophy of memory, we characterize agent memory as malleable, rewritable, and socially propagating, and develop a memory-lifecycle framework organized around six phases -- Write, Store, Retrieve, Execute, Share, Forget/Rollback -- cross-tabulated against four security objectives: integrity, confidentiality, availability, governance. We organize the literature on memory poisoning, extraction, retrieval corruption, control-flow hijacking, cross-agent propagation, rollback, and governance, and situate representative architectures as determinants of which phases are explicitly governable. Three findings stand out: the literature concentrates on write- and retrieve-time integrity attacks, while confidentiality, availability, store/forget, and benign-persistence failures remain sparsely studied; no published architecture covers all nine governance primitives we identify; and using LLMs themselves for memory security remains sparse yet essential. We unify these under mnemonic sovereignty -- verifiable, recoverable governance over what may be written, who may read, when updates are authorized, and which states may be forgotten -- arguing future secure agents will be differentiated not only by recall capacity, but by memory governance quality.