Mark Bedaywi
Publications
Computationally Efficient Collaborative Communication Via Regularity-Based Coarsening
Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication. In particular, in a game with $n$ possible observations and $m$ actions: (1) For any achievable target utility $α$, we give an algorithm with $\mathrm{poly}(n, m, 1/ε)$ runtime that designs a protocol achieving utility at least $α-ε$ using only $2^{\mathcal O(CC_α(G))}/ε^2$ bits of communication. Here, $CC_α(G)$ is the minimum number of bits used by any protocol, even a computationally inefficient one, to achieve utility $α$. (2) We prove that this exponential dependence on $CC_α(G)$ is tight up to a constant. That is, unless $\mathrm P=\mathrm{NP}$, no polynomial-time algorithm can in general find optimal protocols using fewer than $2^{CC_α(G) -2}$ bits. We note that our results strictly weaken the assumptions required by prior work in the multi-agent information aggregation literature, filling a gap that had remained elusive even for games with constant $CC_α(G)$. In particular, prior guarantees for agreement-based information aggregation rely on structural assumptions such as informational substitutes or weak learnability. We show that these assumptions already imply $CC_α(G) = O(1)$ and are therefore more restrictive conditions than required by our protocol to succeed. On a technical level, our results involve a novel strengthening of the Frieze-Kannan weak regularity lemma and yield the following powerful polynomial-time transformation tool: for every communication game $G$, it constructs a game $\hat G$ that is a coarsening of the agents' observation spaces into constant-size partitions, such that $G$ and $\hat G$ are indistinguishable with respect to every short communication protocol. This coarsening theorem is the engine behind our algorithm and may be of independent interest.
Provably Optimal Learning Algorithms for Assistance Games
This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function. While the informed agent (the human) observes a latent state of the world, the uninformed agent (the assistant) observes only the human's actions. We provide the first provably efficient learning algorithms for repeated assistance games. We introduce the notion of assistance regret: the gap between the cumulative utility of interactions and that of the optimal joint policies in hindsight, which map latent states to action pairs. We present decentralized algorithms for both the human and the assistant that achieve a $(1-1/e)$-approximate assistance regret rate of $\widetilde{O}(T^{3/4})$, with runtime polynomial in the size of the action and state spaces. These algorithms are general; in particular, they accommodate any no-regret algorithm for the assistant. We prove that achieving a regret approximation factor better than $(1-1/e)$ is computationally intractable. Furthermore, we demonstrate how these generic no-regret algorithms can be tailored to a pseudo-decentralized setting -- using a shared random string -- to achieve a rate of $\widetilde{O}(T^{1/2})$, optimal up to logarithmic factors.