G. Keeling
Famous AuthorPublications
Theory of Mind and Self-Attributions of Mentality are Dissociable in LLMs
Safety fine-tuning in Large Language Models (LLMs) seeks to suppress potentially harmful forms of mind-attribution such as models asserting their own consciousness or claiming to experience emotions. We investigate whether suppressing mind-attribution tendencies degrades intimately related socio-cognitive abilities such as Theory of Mind (ToM). Through safety ablation and mechanistic analyses of representational similarity, we demonstrate that LLM attributions of mind to themselves and to technological artefacts are behaviorally and mechanistically dissociable from ToM capabilities. Nevertheless, safety fine-tuned models under-attribute mind to non-human animals relative to human baselines and are less likely to exhibit spiritual belief, suppressing widely shared perspectives regarding the distribution and nature of non-human minds.
Architecting Trust in Artificial Epistemic Agents
Large language models increasingly function as epistemic agents -- entities that can 1) autonomously pursue epistemic goals and 2) actively shape our shared knowledge environment. They curate the information we receive, often supplanting traditional search-based methods, and are frequently used to generate both personal and deeply specialized advice. How they perform these functions, including whether they are reliable and properly calibrated to both individual and collective epistemic norms, is therefore highly consequential for the choices we make. We argue that the potential impact of epistemic AI agents on practices of knowledge creation, curation and synthesis, particularly in the context of complex multi-agent interactions, creates new informational interdependencies that necessitate a fundamental shift in evaluation and governance of AI. While a well-calibrated ecosystem could augment human judgment and collective decision-making, poorly aligned agents risk causing cognitive deskilling and epistemic drift, making the calibration of these models to human norms a high-stakes necessity. To ensure a beneficial human-AI knowledge ecosystem, we propose a framework centered on building and cultivating the trustworthiness of epistemic AI agents; aligning AI these agents with human epistemic goals; and reinforcing the surrounding socio-epistemic infrastructure. In this context, trustworthy AI agents must demonstrate epistemic competence, robust falsifiability, and epistemically virtuous behaviors, supported by technical provenance systems and "knowledge sanctuaries" designed to protect human resilience. This normative roadmap provides a path toward ensuring that future AI systems act as reliable partners in a robust and inclusive knowledge ecosystem.
On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models
AI is undergoing a paradigm shift with the rise of models (e.g., BERT, DALL-E, GPT-3) that are trained on broad data at scale and are adaptable to a wide range of downstream tasks. We call these models foundation models to underscore their critically central yet incomplete character. This report provides a thorough account of the opportunities and risks of foundation models, ranging from their capabilities (e.g., language, vision, robotics, reasoning, human interaction) and technical principles(e.g., model architectures, training procedures, data, systems, security, evaluation, theory) to their applications (e.g., law, healthcare, education) and societal impact (e.g., inequity, misuse, economic and environmental impact, legal and ethical considerations). Though foundation models are based on standard deep learning and transfer learning, their scale results in new emergent capabilities,and their effectiveness across so many tasks incentivizes homogenization. Homogenization provides powerful leverage but demands caution, as the defects of the foundation model are inherited by all the adapted models downstream. Despite the impending widespread deployment of foundation models, we currently lack a clear understanding of how they work, when they fail, and what they are even capable of due to their emergent properties. To tackle these questions, we believe much of the critical research on foundation models will require deep interdisciplinary collaboration commensurate with their fundamentally sociotechnical nature.