Hongkang Yang
Publications
A First-Principles Theory of Slow Thinking and Active Perception
As part of a series on first-principles modeling of cognitive functions, this paper attempts to provide a mathematical formulation of thinking and perception. It formally derives slow thinking or more generally, active perception, and encompasses the design, training and inference of slow thinking large language models. Our starting point is the lifting and projection of probability distributions on the observable and latent spaces, with the objective of representing complex data distributions by simple function families such as neural networks. A theory called "active lifting" is proposed, based on the sampling of latent sequences and an intrinsic drive to reduce uncertainty with maximum rate. It derives a large design space, containing the slow thinking models in a subspace that we call the static theory. These models are positioned on the representation hierarchy and sampler hierarchy induced by the static theory, and can be upgraded by climbing the two hierarchies. Active lifting further derives an inference process with an internal time axis, and a training objective that resembles minimum-length coding as well as the invention of languages. Thus, it characterizes the agency of perception, including the emergence of the slow thinking formats. Technical by-products of this theory include a three-stage pathway for improving slow thinking models, a unified approach to constructing encoders and generative models for all data modalities, a priori formation of human-like visual representations, and a possible solution to policy collapse.
Small Initialization Matters for Large Language Models
Large language models provide a tractable system for asking how intelligence itself emerges, rather than only how LLMs can be engineered. Although progress is usually attributed to scale, data and architecture, we show that parameter initialization is a gene-like determinant of training and, in particular, of model capacity. Reducing the initialization scale consistently improves pretraining, with the largest gains on reasoning-demanding tasks. We identify two widely used empirical settings that restrain the advantage of small initialization, and show how relaxing them restores favorable scaling. We further uncover a critical initialization that balances the reasoning and training. Mechanistically, small initialization drives a distinct developmental trajectory: parameters first condense into low-complexity structures and later expand into richer representations, giving concrete form to the idea that compression is intelligence. Token-level analyses show that the gains concentrate on non-trivial, context-constrained predictions rather than all tokens uniformly. These results motivate a simple $γ$-initialization rule: expose initialization rage as an explicit knob and use small initialization by default, an almost cost-free intervention that improves pretraining and strengthens reasoning across model scales.