H. Chen
Publications
AcceptMoE: Commitment-Weighted Self-Sizing Verifier Expert Sets for Efficient MoE Speculative Decoding
Speculative decoding verifies a tree of draft tokens in one target-model forward pass. For a mixture-of-experts (MoE) target, however, parallel verification can activate the union of the experts selected by all tree nodes, even though only a small subset of those nodes reaches the accepted output. Token count, activated-expert union size, and expert-weight traffic are therefore distinct cost measures: reducing the token workload need not shrink the expert union proportionally, and under offloading, transfer traffic also depends on cache residency. We introduce AcceptMoE, a verifier-side expert selector that combines target-router scores with offline-estimated commitment probabilities and automatically adjusts the number of eligible experts for each verification block, eliminating the need for a user-specified expert budget. Under offloading, AcceptMoE conditions expert eligibility on cache residency instead of predicting natural routes and prefetching the corresponding expert weights. Although constraining target-expert eligibility changes the model distribution, across 12 model-task pairs spanning three MoE targets and four benchmarks, AcceptMoE's mean accuracy is 0.27 percentage points lower than that of EAGLE-3 speculative decoding with natural routing. Served with SGLang at batch size one, it reaches 1.290 times the throughput of this baseline with all expert weights in GPU memory, and 2.06 times under physical expert offloading, while reducing host-to-device traffic by 73.6 percent to 77.1 percent.
Gaming-Resistant Insurance Contracts for Autonomous AI Agents: Strategy-Proof Toll Mechanism Design
Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget. It treats the operator as passive. This paper makes the operator strategic. We characterise a five-attack space for autonomous AI-agent insurance contracts and prove when the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant. Two attack surfaces -- post-toll safe-default selection and within-boundary action splitting -- are closed by Paper A's minimal-authority and no-splitting clauses. The remaining three require new contract clauses. First, common-control aggregation prevents cross-boundary re-routing from reducing toll below the boundary potential applied to total exposure. Second, interface failures such as invalid JSON are contract-relevant events, not safety wins: treating them as zero-toll safe defaults can reward unreliable models, while escalation fees reverse the incentive. We validate this interface-compliance theorem on committed cross-model traces from the companion empirical paper. Third, a model-identity menu with a componentwise-minimum penalty schedule makes truthful reporting of the deployed model weakly dominant. We then compose these clauses with Paper A's runtime guarantees to obtain joint incentive compatibility over the five-attack space. Finally, a two-parameter premium family discharges operator individual rationality and weak budget balance at the truthful equilibrium. The result is an incentive-compatibility layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.