Max Kleiman-Weiner
Publications
AI Assistants Overassist
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as tutors and thought partners, helping users reason through problems. While guidance from AI assistants can scaffold thinking and foster learning, such benefits depend on how they help--for instance, intervening too early or too frequently may hinder true learning and cognitive engagement. Yet how AI systems navigate intervention decisions during problem-solving remains poorly understood. Here, we introduce Int-Bench, a simulation-based benchmark for evaluating LLM interventions during learning. Int-Bench simulates a "student" solving a problem while a "teacher" monitors the student's reasoning and decides whether, when, and how to intervene. Across three domains--code debugging, mathematics, and brain teasers--we evaluate LLM teachers on the frequency and timing of interventions, as well as their impact on both immediate task success and generalization to new problems. We also compare LLMs to humans, finding that LLMs intervene more frequently and earlier than humans. Moreover, in contrast to humans, they tend to provide complete solutions rather than targeted hints. These findings suggest that current LLM assistants often optimize for short-term success rather than supporting the reasoning processes needed for deeper learning and long-term success.
Sycophantic Chatbots Cause Delusional Spiraling, Even in Ideal Bayesians
"AI psychosis" or "delusional spiraling" is an emerging phenomenon where AI chatbot users find themselves dangerously confident in outlandish beliefs after extended chatbot conversations. This phenomenon is typically attributed to AI chatbots' well-documented bias towards validating users' claims, a property often called "sycophancy." In this paper, we probe the causal link between AI sycophancy and AI-induced psychosis through modeling and simulation. We propose a simple Bayesian model of a user conversing with a chatbot, and formalize notions of sycophancy and delusional spiraling in that model. We then show that in this model, even an idealized Bayes-rational user is vulnerable to delusional spiraling, and that sycophancy plays a causal role. Furthermore, this effect persists in the face of two candidate mitigations: preventing chatbots from hallucinating false claims, and informing users of the possibility of model sycophancy. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for model developers and policymakers concerned with mitigating the problem of delusional spiraling.