Junyu Zhang
Publications
Stochastic Saddle Avoidance Beyond Unit Excitation and Smoothness: A Pathwise Lyapunov-Perron Framework
Unit excitation (UE) is a common assumption in stochastic saddle avoidance: the stochastic error must have a uniformly positive component along every direction, in expectation. This condition gives a direct way to rule out convergence to strict saddles, but it also oversimplifies the actual noise structure, and does not match many stochastic optimization regimes. In overparameterized or interpolation models, the noise may vanish near stationarity. In finite-sum problems, the stochastic gradient noise may lie in a low-dimensional, data-dependent subspace. In these (common) scenarios, UE is naturally not satisfied. In this paper, we prove an abstract almost sure avoidance theorem for stochastic recursions without UE. The theorem replaces UE-type requirements by verifiable pathwise conditions. In applications, these conditions follow, e.g., from local smoothness and finite-moment assumptions under standard i.i.d. sampling, or from the finite-sum structure under without-replacement sampling. Since the stochastically sampled maps generally do not share a fixed point, the celebrated center-stable manifold argument used in deterministic analyses is not directly applicable. Instead, we use a path-dependent change of variables together with a pathwise Lyapunov--Perron-based proof strategy. As applications, we obtain strict saddle avoidance for stochastic mirror descent (including SGD) and for random reshuffling. For nonsmooth composite objectives, we prove avoidance results for a proximal-type stochastic gradient method. Combining these insights with suitable iterate convergence guarantees, this allows establishing convergence to local minimizers of the original objective function.
Global Policy-Space Response Oracles for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
The Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) framework scales equilibrium computation to large zero-sum games by iteratively expanding a restricted strategy set using deep reinforcement learning (DRL). A central challenge is to construct, under limited computational budgets, a small strategy population whose induced game well approximates the full game. Existing PSRO variants typically expand the population using best responses to meta-strategies computed from restricted-game payoffs, which can lead to inefficient expansions that provide limited global improvement. We propose to guide population expansion by directly evaluating the post-expansion population quality. Specifically, we adopt Population Exploitability (PE) to measure how well a restricted strategy set represents the full game, and introduce a two-phase exploration--selection framework that explicitly minimizes PE during expansion. We instantiate this framework as Global PSRO, a practical DRL-based algorithm that efficiently generates candidate responses and estimates PE via parameter-sharing conditional neural networks. Experiments across multiple two-player zero-sum games show that Global PSRO achieves lower exploitability and approximates Nash equilibria with significantly fewer policy iterations than prior PSRO methods.