Charles Fleming
Publications
Context-Fractured Decomposition Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents: Exploiting Artifact Provenance Gaps
Tool-using LLM agents interact with the world through actions that persist state in artifacts (e.g., workspace files or logs). Consequently, jailbreak defenses must reason about cross-step composition rather than isolated text. Yet most existing attacks and defenses, including ``multi-turn'' jailbreaks such as Crescendo and Tree of Attacks,still assume a single contiguous conversation visible to the defender. This assumption breaks down in real agent pipelines, where enforcement is fragmented across tools, modules, and time, and where artifact provenance is often not tracked. We operationalize a deployment failure mode for tool-using LLM agents, the \emph{provenance gap}, and study reproducible triggers for it: \emph{Context-Fractured Decomposition} (CFD), a family of cross-context multi-step jailbreaks that preserve benign-looking intermediate artifacts from an early interaction and elicit harmful behavior much later, potentially in a different agent instance or workflow stage, via individually innocuous tool actions whose risk emerges only under delayed artifact-mediated composition. We instrument the failure mode with trace-level diagnostics and outline a verifiable mitigation direction (provenance lineage tagging). Across agent-system jailbreak benchmarks, CFD improves success rates by up to 28.3 percentage points over state-of-the-art baselines, even against strong single-turn judges. Disclaimer: This paper contains examples of harmful or offensive language.
REFLECT: Intervention-Supported Error Attribution for Silent Failures in LLM Agent Traces
Large language model (LLM) agents now solve complex tasks through long plan-and-execution traces, yet the ability to locate errors in a completed traces still lags far behind, especially in the \emph{silent failure} regime. Existing approaches predict suspect steps via classifiers or LLM judges, or recover correct answers via retry, but none feed the intervention outcome back to \emph{refine the attribution itself}. We propose \methodname, a method that closes this gap by diagnosing a candidate error step, testing it through controlled replay with a diagnosis-specific patch, and using the verified outcome flip as contrastive evidence to refine the final attribution. Across four localization benchmarks spanning multi-hop reasoning across domains, \methodname achieves the highest localization accuracy among same-auditor methods across all four benchmarks, with the largest gains on structured tool-use traces, while providing actionable localization even when ground-truth answers are unavailable.
Cordyceps: Covert Control Attacks on LLMs via Data Poisoning
Large language models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned on uncurated text datasets that adversaries can poison. Existing poisoning attacks primarily rely on fixed trigger phrases that defenses such as outlier detection, clean-data regularization, or online monitoring can neutralize. In this paper, we propose a data poisoning method that teaches an LLM an information hiding scheme reliably and stealthily through semantic associations between shared knowledge such as facts or concepts and attacker-chosen phrases. The induced hiding scheme can encode and decode arbitrary malicious instructions, thus revealing a new and subtle poisoning-induced vulnerability: covert control attacks. We precisely characterize covert control attacks and evaluate them across $5$ LLMs, $3$ backdoor defenses, and $4$ prompt injection defenses. With a small poisoned fraction, covert control attacks outperform heuristic-based prompt injection attacks in average attack success rate by about $40\%$ relative to clean fine-tuned models. They also circumvent defenses based on detection and fine-tuning, maintaining up to $93\%$ attack success rate after backdoor defenses and up to $98\%$ after prompt injection defenses.