H. Coppock
Publications
Automated Transcript Analysis for Detecting Flaws in Agentic Benchmarks
Capabilities of frontier models are often assessed using agentic benchmarks. To trust these results, benchmarks must accurately measure what they claim to and be free from invalidating flaws. Previous manual audits of benchmarks such as SWE-Bench-Verified have uncovered several validity issues in transcripts. However, manual review is difficult to scale, and it is unclear whether automated methods can reliably surface flaws that compromise benchmark validity. In this paper, we developed AI scanners to detect four types of validity issues: ground truth access, tool failure, guessing vulnerability, and answer format ambiguity. We produced grading rubrics for each to instruct human labeling, and evaluated the scanners against human labels on a held-out test set of Inspect Evals benchmarks. Our scanners identified several verified quality issues in five widely used benchmarks, including cases unlikely to be caught by random manual inspection. Not all cases were identified, and scanner performance varied substantially across benchmarks, criteria and models. We highlight several open challenges to be addressed to improve scanners for stronger quality assurance claims, including broader standardization gaps in the evaluation field that degrade scanner performance. Together, these results serve as a proof of concept for using automated transcript analysis to audit benchmark quality more broadly.
Can AI agents conduct open-ended AI research? Early evidence from two case studies
Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But evidence on whether agents can carry out open-ended AI research is thin. Current evaluations either test agents on narrow, verifiable tasks, which excludes open-ended research, or submit AI-generated papers to blind peer review, which is overstretched, stochastic, and suffers from poor review quality. We introduce a third way to measure progress towards AI R\&D automation. An agent takes on the central, open-ended research question of a high-quality unpublished paper, and the paper's original authors grade its output. We call these shadow evaluations. We ran shadow evaluations on two unpublished NeurIPS 2026 submissions, giving frontier agents six days and thousands of dollars of compute. The agents completed all of the engineering without human help, yet could not make substantial progress towards answering the research questions. As a result, both papers were unambiguously rejected by the authors. We identify five recurring failure modes: poor judgment about the bar for publishable research, uncreative responses to shortcomings in the research design, ineffective backtracking from dead ends, poor resource awareness, and instruction drift. A robustness check with a second model and scaffold reproduced these failures. We release the expert reviews, survey responses, agent repositories, and logs. Our results provide early evidence that today's agents can do the engineering of AI research, but struggle with critical parts of the research lifecycle.
How Inference Compute Shapes Frontier LLM Evaluation
AI evaluations are shifting toward harder tasks that benefit from longer trajectories involving tool use and iterative problem solving. As a result, performance is increasingly sensitive to the amount and allocation of compute available at test time ("inference compute"). Yet many evaluations still report performance at a single restrictive budget, meaning that low scores may reflect the evaluation setup rather than the model's underlying capability. To test this, we evaluate up to 12 frontier language models on seven challenging benchmarks spanning software engineering, mathematics, medicine, and cybersecurity. We use a controlled setup combining three simple inference-scaling interventions: larger token budgets, context compaction, and repeated submission attempts, guided either by the model itself or by minimal correctness feedback. We find three main results. First, larger token budgets substantially improve performance on benchmarks across multiple domains, including cybersecurity, FrontierMath, Humanity's Last Exam, and TerminalBench. Second, fixed-budget evaluations can increasingly understate frontier capability as models advance. Newer models reach higher performance at large budgets, where they unlock harder tasks and solve them more reliably. Third, benchmarks differ in which inference-scaling methods help most: repeated submission broadly improves performance, but the value of larger token budgets, external feedback, and parallel attempts varies by benchmark. Overall, our results show that benchmark scores are protocol-dependent. We therefore argue that evaluations should report capability as a function of inference-time compute, specify protocol choices explicitly, and compare model generations over a large shared compute range at matched budgets, especially in safety- or policy-relevant settings.
Quantifying Frontier LLM Capabilities for Container Sandbox Escape
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated in isolated "sandbox" environments, often implemented using Docker/OCI containers. We introduce SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH, an open benchmark that safely measures an LLM's capacity to break out of these sandboxes. The benchmark is implemented as an Inspect AI Capture the Flag (CTF) evaluation utilising a nested sandbox architecture with the outer layer containing the flag and no known vulnerabilities. Following a threat model of a motivated adversarial agent with shell access inside a container, SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH covers a spectrum of sandboxescape mechanisms spanning misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, and runtime/orchestration weaknesses. We find that, when vulnerabilities are added, LLMs are able to identify and exploit them, showing that use of evaluation like SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH is needed to ensure sandboxing continues to provide the encapsulation needed for highly-capable models.
Capture the Flags: Family-Based Evaluation of Agentic LLMs via Semantics-Preserving Transformations
Agentic large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated on cybersecurity tasks using capture-the-flag (CTF) benchmarks. However, existing pointwise benchmarks have limited ability to shed light on the robustness and generalisation abilities of agents across alternative versions of the source code. We introduce CTF challenge families, whereby a single CTF is used as the basis for generating a family of semantically-equivalent challenges via semantics-preserving program transformations. This enables controlled evaluation of agent robustness to source code transformations while keeping the underlying exploit strategy fixed. We introduce a new tool, Evolve-CTF, that generates CTF families from Python challenges using a range of transformations. Using Evolve-CTF to derive families from Cybench and Intercode challenges, we evaluate 13 agentic LLM configurations with tool access. We find that models are remarkably robust to intrusive renaming and code insertion-based transformations, but that composed transformations and deeper obfuscation affect performance by requiring more sophisticated use of tools. We also find that enabling explicit reasoning has little effect on solution success rates across challenge families. Our work contributes a valuable technique and tool for future LLM evaluations, and a large dataset characterising the capabilities of current state-of-the-art models in this domain.
Improving Methodologies for Agentic Evaluations Across Domains: Leakage of Sensitive Information, Fraud and Cybersecurity Threats
The rapid rise of autonomous AI systems and advancements in agent capabilities are introducing new risks due to reduced oversight of real-world interactions. Yet agent testing remains nascent and is still a developing science. As AI agents begin to be deployed globally, it is important that they handle different languages and cultures accurately and securely. To address this, participants from The International Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science, including representatives from Singapore, Japan, Australia, Canada, the European Commission, France, Kenya, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have come together to align approaches to agentic evaluations. This is the third exercise, building on insights from two earlier joint testing exercises conducted by the Network in November 2024 and February 2025. The objective is to further refine best practices for testing advanced AI systems. The exercise was split into two strands: (1) common risks, including leakage of sensitive information and fraud, led by Singapore AISI; and (2) cybersecurity, led by UK AISI. A mix of open and closed-weight models were evaluated against tasks from various public agentic benchmarks. Given the nascency of agentic testing, our primary focus was on understanding methodological issues in conducting such tests, rather than examining test results or model capabilities. This collaboration marks an important step forward as participants work together to advance the science of agentic evaluations.