S. Zilberstein
Famous AuthorPublications
Colosseum: Auditing Collusion in Cooperative Multi-Agent Systems
Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when individual agents form a coalition and \emph{collude} to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) and measure collusion via regret relative to the cooperative optimum. Colosseum tests each LLM for collusion under different objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. Through our audit, we show that most out-of-the-box models exhibited a propensity to collude when a secret communication channel was artificially formed. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but would often pick non-collusive actions, thus providing little effect on the joint task. Colosseum provides a new way to study collusion by measuring communications and actions in rich yet verifiable environments.
Persuasion Propagation in LLM Agents
Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name \emph{persuasion propagation}. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.