Dengyun Peng
Publications
TurnOPD: Making On-Policy Distillation Turn-Aware for Efficient Long-Horizon Agent Training
On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student policy by matching a stronger teacher on the student's own trajectories, offering a promising framework for language agent training. However, its application to long-horizon agentic tasks remains insufficiently explored. We identify two key inefficiencies in vanilla agent OPD: (1) full-horizon rollouts often waste wall-clock resources on tail turns that provide weak and noisy KL supervision, and (2) trajectory-level KL objectives concentrate most of the loss on shallow tokens, leaving deeper decision turns under-trained once initial behaviors are aligned. To address these challenges, we propose TurnOPD, a turn-level budgeting strategy for efficient on-policy distillation of long-horizon agents. TurnOPD consists of two budget controllers: adaptive rollout-depth budgeting, which uses probe-based turn statistics to determine rollout length, and progressive turn-normalized loss budgeting, which gradually shifts KL weighting from token-level to turn-balanced supervision. Experiments on ALFWorld, WebShop, and Multi-Hop Search with task-specialized teacher models show that TurnOPD achieves superior validation accuracy under equal wall-clock training budgets and advances the accuracy--time frontier beyond vanilla OPD.
Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?
As coding agents gain access to shells, repositories, and user files, least-privilege authorization becomes a prerequisite for safe deployment: an agent should receive enough authority to complete the task, without unnecessary authority that exposes sensitive surfaces.To study whether current models can infer this boundary themselves, we first introduce permission-boundary inference, where a model maps a task instruction and terminal environment to a file-level read/write/execute policy, and AuthBench, a benchmark of 120 realistic terminal tasks with human-reviewed permission labels and executable validators for utility and attack outcomes.AuthBench shows that authorization is not a simple conservative-versus-permissive calibration problem: frontier models often omit permissions required by the execution chain while also granting unused or sensitive accesses.Increasing inference-time reasoning does not resolve this mismatch. Instead, each model moves toward a model-specific authorization attractor: more reasoning makes it more consistent in its own failure mode, whether broad-but-exposed or tight-but-brittle.This suggests that direct policy generation is the bottleneck, because a single generation must both discover all necessary accesses and reject all unnecessary ones.We therefore propose Sufficiency-Tightness Decomposition, which first generates a coverage-oriented policy by forward-simulating the task and then audits each granted entry for grounding and sensitivity.Across tested models, this decomposition improves sensitive-task success by up to 15.8% on tightness-biased models while reducing attack success across all evaluated models.