N. Gong
Famous AuthorPublications
When Think-with-Image Meets Safety: What Determines Multimodal Jailbreak Robustness?
Think-with-image reasoning is emerging as a new inference paradigm for large vision-language models, but its safety implications remain poorly understood. Existing systems already span multiple process designs, including direct response generation, text-only prior turn, visual-state manipulation, and explicit external image-tool invocation. In this paper, we ask which of these evaluated paradigms improves multimodal jailbreak robustness, and why. Across multiple vision-language models, explicit image-tool interaction yields the lowest attack success rates in our experiments, reducing jailbreak success by around 30% relative on average across the evaluated models. This finding is initially surprising: ASR remains low even when the returned image-tool output is manually overridden or itself unsafe-looking, but returns near direct-answering levels under text-only prior turn controls. These results indicate that the lower ASR is not explained by benign returned-image semantics or by the textual image-tool trace alone. To explain the pattern, we introduce an image-tool safety vector framework that models image-tool invocation as a residual shift in hidden representations toward a safety-relevant direction. Representation-level analyses and activation interventions support this account. Overall, our results suggest that explicit image-tool interaction is a promising design pattern for improving jailbreak robustness, while also motivating pipeline-specific safety evaluation.
Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection
Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for analyzing Internet-scale image data, offering significant benefits but also raising critical safety and societal concerns. In particular, open-weight MLLMs may be misused to extract sensitive information from personal images at scale, such as identities, locations, or other private details. In this work, we propose ImageProtector, a user-side method that proactively protects images before sharing by embedding a carefully crafted, nearly imperceptible perturbation that acts as a visual prompt injection attack on MLLMs. As a result, when an adversary analyzes a protected image with an MLLM, the MLLM is consistently induced to generate a refusal response such as "I'm sorry, I can't help with that request." We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of ImageProtector across six MLLMs and four datasets. Additionally, we evaluate three potential countermeasures, Gaussian noise, DiffPure, and adversarial training, and show that while they partially mitigate the impact of ImageProtector, they simultaneously degrade model accuracy and/or efficiency. Our study focuses on the practically important setting of open-weight MLLMs and large-scale automated image analysis, and highlights both the promise and the limitations of perturbation-based privacy protection.
RankLLM: Weighted Ranking of LLMs by Quantifying Question Difficulty
Benchmarks establish a standardized evaluation framework to systematically assess the performance of large language models (LLMs), facilitating objective comparisons and driving advancements in the field. However, existing benchmarks fail to differentiate question difficulty, limiting their ability to effectively distinguish models' capabilities. To address this limitation, we propose RankLLM, a novel framework designed to quantify both question difficulty and model competency. RankLLM introduces difficulty as the primary criterion for differentiation, enabling a more fine-grained evaluation of LLM capabilities. RankLLM's core mechanism facilitates bidirectional score propagation between models and questions. The core intuition of RankLLM is that a model earns a competency score when it correctly answers a question, while a question's difficulty score increases when it challenges a model. Using this framework, we evaluate 30 models on 35,550 questions across multiple domains. RankLLM achieves 90% agreement with human judgments and consistently outperforms strong baselines such as IRT. It also exhibits strong stability, fast convergence, and high computational efficiency, making it a practical solution for large-scale, difficulty-aware LLM evaluation.
WebSentinel: Detecting and Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks for Web Agents
Prompt injection attacks manipulate webpage content to cause web agents to execute attacker-specified tasks instead of the user's intended ones. Existing methods for detecting and localizing such attacks achieve limited effectiveness, as their underlying assumptions often do not hold in the web-agent setting. In this work, we propose WebSentinel, a two-step approach for detecting and localizing prompt injection attacks in webpages. Given a webpage, Step I extracts \emph{segments of interest} that may be contaminated, and Step II evaluates each segment by checking its consistency with the webpage content as context. We show that WebSentinel is highly effective, substantially outperforming baseline methods across multiple datasets of both contaminated and clean webpages that we collected. Our code is available at: https://github.com/wxl-lxw/WebSentinel.