Zheyuan Deng
Publications
MatrAIx: Simulating the World with 8.3 Billion Persona Agents
Human evaluation of AI systems and digital products is costly, slow, and difficult to scale. Offline evaluations are more scalable but often abstract away human diversity and interactive behavior. We therefore introduce MatrAIx, a population-scale simulated-user evaluation infrastructure for testing AI systems and digital products with heterogeneous users. MatrAIx has three core components: First, Persona 8B contains 8.3 billion persona records represented by 1,290 categorical dimensions. Records are either sampled from a dependency graph that preserves correlated attributes or derived from human-authored profiles. We release a quality-filtered coreset of approximately 1 million personas, comprising 599,847 human-grounded and 400,000 synthetic records. Second, the MatrAIx Playground provides four environments in which diverse users evaluate and interact with digital products: Survey, AI Chatbot, Web, and App. Third, MatrAIx provides 1,010 application tasks spanning more than 25 domains, including Commerce, Software, Finance, and Healthcare. We conducted 18,189 evaluation trials across eight representative tasks. Persona agents were powered by three LLMs: Claude Opus 4.8, GPT 5.5, and Claude Haiku 4.5. The resulting feedback captures how decisions and preferences vary across persona backgrounds, including hesitation after a price increase, willingness to continue after an AI assistant fails, and latency tolerance. We conducted two main validation studies: First, a 400-trial controlled study evaluated persona adherence across ten behavioral attributes and all four environments. The declared behavior was expressed or correctly suppressed in 366 trials (91.5%). Second, human and LLM judges evaluated the extraction quality of human-grounded personas. Overall, MatrAIx provides an end-to-end infrastructure for evaluating AI systems and digital products with diverse simulated human users.
Chain of Risk: Safety Failures in Large Reasoning Models and Mitigation via Adaptive Multi-Principle Steering
Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.