Rohit Agarwal
Publications
Goedel-Architect: Streamlining Formal Theorem Proving with Blueprint Generation and Refinement
We introduce Goedel-Architect, an agentic framework for formal theorem proving in Lean 4 centered on blueprint generation and refinement. A blueprint is a dependency graph of definitions and lemmas that builds up to the main theorem. First, Goedel-Architect generates a blueprint of formally stated definitions and lemmas, along with declared dependencies. This blueprint is optionally guided by a natural language proof. Then, a tool-equipped Lean prover component closes each open lemma node in parallel using relevant dependencies. Failed lemmas in turn drive refinement of the global blueprint. This strategy contrasts with other mainstream approaches which use recursive lemma decomposition, and can inefficiently loop on dead-end strategies. Using the open-weight DeepSeek-V4-Flash (284B-A13B) as the backbone, Goedel-Architect attains 99.2% pass@1 on MiniF2F-test and 75.6% pass@1 on PutnamBench. With an optional natural-language proof seeding the initial blueprint on the harder problems, we additionally close the remaining two MiniF2F-test problems (reaching 100%), lift PutnamBench to 88.8% (597/672), and solve 4/6 on IMO 2025, 11/12 on Putnam 2025, and 3/6 on USAMO 2026. This represents state-of-the-art performance for an open-source pipeline at a price point up to 500x less than comparable open-source pipelines.
AI Alignment via Incentives and Correction
We study AI alignment through the lens of law-and-economics models of deterrence and enforcement. In these models, misconduct is not treated as an external failure, but as a strategic response to incentives: an actor weighs the gain from violation against the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. We argue that the same logic arises naturally in agentic AI pipelines. A solver may benefit from producing a persuasive but incorrect answer, hiding uncertainty, or exploiting spurious shortcuts, while an auditor or verifier must decide whether costly monitoring is worthwhile. Alignment is therefore a fixed-point problem: stronger penalties may deter solver misbehavior, but they can also reduce the auditor's incentive to inspect, since auditing then mainly incurs cost on a population that appears increasingly aligned. This perspective also changes what should count as a post-training signal. Standard feedback often attaches reward to the final answer alone, but a solver-auditor pipeline exposes the full correction event: whether the solver erred, whether the auditor inspected, whether the error was caught, and whether oversight incentives remained active. We formalize this interaction in a two-agent model in which a principal chooses rewards over joint correction outcomes, inducing both solver behavior and auditor monitoring. Reward design is therefore a bilevel optimization problem: rewards are judged not by their immediate semantic meaning, but by the behavioral equilibrium they induce. We propose a bandit-based outer-loop procedure for searching over reward profiles using noisy interaction feedback. Experiments on an LLM coding pipeline show that adaptive reward profiles can maintain useful oversight pressure and improve principal-aligned outcomes relative to static hand-designed rewards, including a substantial reduction in hallucinated incorrect attempts.