Zhuoyun Li
Publications
Where Do Prompt Perturbations Break Generation? A Segment-Level View of Robustness in LoRA-Tuned Language Models
Large language models are sensitive to minor prompt perturbations, yet existing robustness methods usually enforce consistency at the whole-sequence level. This holistic view can hide an important failure mode: a perturbed response may remain globally similar to the clean one while drifting on a critical entity, relation, or conclusion. We introduce S$^2$R$^2$, a segment-level framework for robust LoRA fine-tuning. S$^2$R$^2$ decomposes clean and perturbed generations into semantic segments, aligns them with an optimal-transport objective, and penalises the segments with the largest meaning drift. To connect this output-side objective with model adaptation, we add an adapter-stability regulariser motivated by segment-level attention reallocation, using LoRA norm control as a tractable proxy for limiting perturbation-amplified evidence shifts. A PAC-Bayesian complexity view further explains why controlling adapter growth may support transfer beyond observed perturbations. Experiments on summarisation benchmarks show that S$^2$R$^2$ improves robustness under typographical noise, deletion, synonym replacement, and paraphrasing, while maintaining competitive clean performance and stronger cross-dataset transfer than consistency-based baselines.
Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models Through the Visual Modality
The visual modality of vision-language models (VLMs) is an underexplored attack surface for bypassing safety alignment. We introduce four jailbreak attacks exploiting the vision component: (1) encoding harmful instructions as visual symbol sequences with a decoding legend, (2) replacing harmful objects with benign substitutes (e.g., bomb -> banana) then prompting for harmful actions using the substitute term, (3) replacing harmful text in images (e.g., on book covers) with benign words while visual context preserves the original meaning, and (4) visual analogy puzzles whose solution requires inferring a prohibited concept. Evaluating across six frontier VLMs, our visual attacks bypass safety alignment and expose a cross-modality alignment gap: text-based safety training does not automatically generalize to harmful intent conveyed visually. For example, our visual cipher achieves 40.9% attack success on Claude-Haiku-4.5 versus 10.7% for an equivalent textual cipher. To further our insight into the attack mechanism, we present preliminary interpretability and mitigation results. These findings highlight that robust VLM alignment requires treating vision as a first-class target for safety post-training.