Kailong Wang
Publications
PhySE: A Psychological Framework for Real-Time AR-LLM Social Engineering Attacks
The emerging threat of AR-LLM-based Social Engineering (AR-LLM-SE) attacks (e.g. SEAR) poses a significant risk to real-world social interactions. In such an attack, a malicious actor uses Augmented Reality (AR) glasses to capture a target visual and vocal data. A Large Language Model (LLM) then analyzes this data to identify the individual and generate a detailed social profile. Subsequently, LLM-powered agents employ social engineering strategies, providing real-time conversation suggestions, to gain the target trust and ultimately execute phishing or other malicious acts. Despite its potential, the practical application of AR-LLM-SE faces two major bottlenecks, (1) Cold-start personalization, Current Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) methods introduce critical delays in the earliest turns, slowing initial profile formation and disrupting real-time interaction, (2) Static Attack Strategies, Existing approaches rely on fixed-stage, handcrafted social engineering tactics that lack foundation in established psychological theory. To address these limitations, we propose PhySE, a novel framework with two core innovations, (1) VLM-Based SocialContext Training, To eliminate profiling delays, we efficiently pre-train a Visual Language Model (VLM) with social-context data, enabling rapid, on-the-fly profile generation, (2) Adaptive Psychological Agent, We introduce a psychological LLM that dynamically deploys distinct classes of psychological strategies based on target response, moving beyond static, handcrafted scripts. We evaluated PhySE through an IRB-approved user study with 60 participants, collecting a novel dataset of 360 annotated conversations across diverse social scenarios.
UNSEEN: A Cross-Stack LLM Unlearning Defense against AR-LLM Social Engineering Attacks
Emerging AR-LLM-based Social Engineering attack (e.g., SEAR) is at the edge of posing great threats to real-world social life. In such AR-LLM-SE attack, the attacker can leverage AR (Augmented Reality) glass to capture the image and vocal information of the target, using the LLM to identify the target and generate the social profile, using the LLM agents to apply social engineering strategies for conversation suggestion to win the target trust and perform phishing afterwards. Current defensive approaches, such as role-based access control or data flow tracking, are not directly applicable to the convergent AR-LLM ecosystem (considering embedded AR device and opaque LLM inference), leaving an emerging and potent social engineering threat that existing privacy paradigms are ill-equipped to address. This necessitates a shift beyond solely human-centric measures like legislation and user education toward enforceable vendor policies and platform-level restrictions. Realizing this vision, however, faces significant technical challenges: securing resource-constrained AR-embedded devices, implementing fine-grained access control within opaque LLM inferences, and governing adaptive interactive agents. To address these challenges, we present UNSEEN, a coordinated cross-stack defense that combines an AR ACL (Access Control Layer) for identity-gated sensing, F-RMU-based LLM unlearning for sensitive profile suppression, and runtime agent guardrails for adaptive interaction control. We evaluate UNSEEN in an IRB-approved user study with 60 participants and a dataset of 360 annotated conversations across realistic social scenarios.