Siva Reddy
Publications
AgentBeats: Agentifying Agent Assessment for Openness, Standardization, and Reproducibility
Agent systems are advancing quickly across domains, but their evaluation remains fragmented. Most benchmarks rely on fixed, LLM-centric harnesses that require heavy integration, create test-production mismatch, and limit fair comparison across diverse agent designs. The root problem is the lack of an open, agent-agnostic assessment interface. We advocate Agentified Agent Assessment (AAA), where evaluation is performed by judge agents and all participants interact through standardized protocols: A2A for task management and MCP for tool access. Conventional benchmarking defines two separate interfaces, one for the benchmark and one for the agent, while AAA only needs one; this yields a generic, unified framework that separates assessment logic from agent implementation and enables reproducible, interoperable, and multi-agent evaluation. We further introduce AgentBeats as a concrete realization of AAA: we identify five practical operation modes that make standardized assessment compatible with real-world constraints on openness, privacy, and reproducibility. To evaluate our design at scale, we conduct two studies: a five-month open competition that drew 298 judge agents across 12 categories together with 467 subject agents from independent participants, showing that AAA applies across a heterogeneous range of benchmarks; and a case study on coding agents that confirms agentified evaluation preserves fidelity with the public record while surfacing previously missing head-to-head results, yielding research insights about agent design. Combining a community-scale field study and a controlled coding case study, we verify that AAA delivers coverage, practicality, and fidelity across heterogeneous scenarios at scale. Together, AAA and AgentBeats offer a clear path toward open, standardized, and reproducible agent assessment.
The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agents
Computer-use agents (CUAs) can now autonomously complete complex tasks in real digital environments, but when misled, they can also be used to automate harmful actions programmatically. Existing safety evaluations largely target explicit threats such as misuse and prompt injection, but overlook a subtle yet critical setting where user instructions are entirely benign and harm arises from the task context or execution outcome. We introduce OS-BLIND, a benchmark that evaluates CUAs under unintended attack conditions, comprising 300 human-crafted tasks across 12 categories, 8 applications, and 2 threat clusters: environment-embedded threats and agent-initiated harms. Our evaluation on frontier models and agentic frameworks reveals that most CUAs exceed 90% attack success rate (ASR), and even the safety-aligned Claude 4.5 Sonnet reaches 73.0% ASR. More interestingly, this vulnerability becomes even more severe, with ASR rising from 73.0% to 92.7% when Claude 4.5 Sonnet is deployed in multi-agent systems. Our analysis further shows that existing safety defenses provide limited protection when user instructions are benign. Safety alignment primarily activates within the first few steps and rarely re-engages during subsequent execution. In multi-agent systems, decomposed subtasks obscure the harmful intent from the model, causing safety-aligned models to fail. We will release our OS-BLIND to encourage the broader research community to further investigate and address these safety challenges.