P. Beckmann
Publications
SciR: A Controllable Benchmark for Scientific Reasoning in LLMs
Three paradigmatic forms of inference recur across scientific reasoning: deduction, induction, and causal abduction. Reliably evaluating LLMs on these in scientific settings is currently out of reach: scientific benchmarks built on human annotations are costly and lack mechanistic ground truth, while synthetic logical-reasoning benchmarks do not resemble real scientific documents. We introduce SciR, a benchmark that combines multi-paradigm reasoning with controllable scientific rendering, anchored on three paradigmatic scientific problems. Tasks are generated from formal objects (deduction tree, inductive rule hypothesis, causal graph) to guarantee verifiable answers, then rendered into multi-document scientific discourse via per-track domain-tuned genres. The construction lets us independently vary two difficulty axes: how hard it is to extract the key information needed for inference, and how hard the principled inference itself is. We test six models. Both axes hurt every model, and their effects compound. The rendering even hurts neurosymbolic pipelines, which hand inference to a verified solver. The two axes yield a per-model extraction-vs-inference profile: for instance, reasoning models like deepseek-r1 mostly surpass non-reasoning instruct models on the inference axis. To our knowledge, SciR is the first multi-paradigm scientific-reasoning benchmark with parametric control on both extraction and inference difficulty.
Where is the Mind? Persona Vectors and LLM Individuation
The individuation problem for large language models asks which entities associated with them, if any, should be identified as minds. We approach this problem through mechanistic interpretability, engaging in particular with recent empirical work on persona vectors, persona space, and emergent misalignment. We argue that three views are the strongest candidates: the virtual instance view and two new views we introduce, the (virtual) instance-persona view and the model-persona view. First, we argue for the virtual instance view on the grounds that attention streams sustain quasi-psychological connections across token-time. Then we present the persona literature, organised around three hypotheses about the internal structure underlying personas in LLMs, and show that the two persona-based views are promising alternatives.