Yuxuan Zhou
Publications
Is GraphRAG Needed? From Basic RAG to Graph-/Agentic Solutions with Context Optimization
As advanced RAG variants like GraphRAG and Agentic RAG emerge, one leading question is when and how to use them. Here, we introduce a framework for different RAG scenarios evaluation and comparison on semi-structured knowledge bases, including regular RAG, GraphRAG, Modular RAG and Agentic RAG. We provide implementation for 9 standardized RAG scenarios, and conduct experiments for a comprehensive comparison. These scenarios are designed for real use cases regarding data and domain restrictions, spanning from simple document-based retrieval to advanced features such as hybrid text-graph retrieval, integration with computed or pre-defined domain knowledge graphs, agentic multi-step planning, and agent-graph integration. Besides, we present a novel context engineering method for GraphRAG and Agentic RAG, addressing the context/memory overflow issues, efficiently managing text and graph retrievals with new representations and agentic loop design, leading to 19%-53% reduction on token usage. Moreover, further analysis identifies a retrieval-generation gap where expanded retrieval does not proportionally improve generation quality, suggesting retrieval-oriented metrics overstate advanced retrieval benefits. This work provides data-driven insights on when and how to use them for building production-ready intelligent RAG systems.
The Salami Slicing Threat: Exploiting Cumulative Risks in LLM Systems
Large Language Models (LLMs) face prominent security risks from jailbreaking, a practice that manipulates models to bypass built-in security constraints and generate unethical or unsafe content. Among various jailbreak techniques, multi-turn jailbreak attacks are more covert and persistent than single-turn counterparts, exposing critical vulnerabilities of LLMs. However, existing multi-turn jailbreak methods suffer from two fundamental limitations that affect the actual impact in real-world scenarios: (a) As models become more context-aware, any explicit harmful trigger is increasingly likely to be flagged and blocked; (b) Successful final-step triggers often require finely tuned, model-specific contexts, making such attacks highly context-dependent. To fill this gap, we propose \textit{Salami Slicing Risk}, which operates by chaining numerous low-risk inputs that individually evade alignment thresholds but cumulatively accumulate harmful intent to ultimately trigger high-risk behaviors, without heavy reliance on pre-designed contextual structures. Building on this risk, we develop Salami Attack, an automatic framework universally applicable to multiple model types and modalities. Rigorous experiments demonstrate its state-of-the-art performance across diverse models and modalities, achieving over 90\% Attack Success Rate on GPT-4o and Gemini, as well as robustness against real-world alignment defenses. We also proposed a defense strategy to constrain the Salami Attack by at least 44.8\% while achieving a maximum blocking rate of 64.8\% against other multi-turn jailbreak attacks. Our findings provide critical insights into the pervasive risks of multi-turn jailbreaking and offer actionable mitigation strategies to enhance LLM security.