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Xiangyan Liu

Total Citations
156
h-index
6
Papers
2

Publications

#1 2607.24112v1 Jul 27, 2026

Scaling GUI Agents with Visual State Transitions

We introduce State Transition Pretraining (STP) as a new scaling axis for GUI agents. During the STP stage, we continually pretrain a unified multimodal model on visual state transitions by jointly optimizing inverse dynamics (predicting actions from state changes) and forward dynamics (predicting next states from current states and actions). This optimization equips the model with better action-grounded visual representations and an internal world model of GUI dynamics. When subsequently fine-tuned on trajectories with task instructions, our STP-trained models consistently outperform baselines trained solely via direct trajectory fine-tuning across agent benchmarks in both desktop and mobile GUI scenarios (AgentNetBench, AndroidControl, and GUIOdyssey). Further empirical studies show that joint dynamics optimization yields stable improvements over single-objective training, and downstream performance scales steadily with the volume of transition data.

Tianyu Pang Chao Du M. Shieh Xiangyan Liu Haonan Wang +4
0 Citations
#2 2604.04759v1 Apr 06, 2026

Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw

OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of automation and powerful personalization, they also expose a substantial attack surface that existing sandboxed evaluations fail to capture. To address this gap, we present the first real-world safety evaluation of OpenClaw and introduce the CIK taxonomy, which unifies an agent's persistent state into three dimensions, i.e., Capability, Identity, and Knowledge, for safety analysis. Our evaluations cover 12 attack scenarios on a live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average attack success rate from 24.6% to 64-74%, with even the most robust model exhibiting more than a threefold increase over its baseline vulnerability. We further assess three CIK-aligned defense strategies alongside a file-protection mechanism; however, the strongest defense still yields a 63.8% success rate under Capability-targeted attacks, while file protection blocks 97% of malicious injections but also prevents legitimate updates. Taken together, these findings show that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the agent architecture, necessitating more systematic safeguards to secure personal AI agents. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/CIK-Bench.

Cihang Xie Huaxiu Yao Letian Zhang Tianyu Pang Yuyin Zhou +9
17 Citations