Li Li
Publications
RaMem: Contextual Reinstatement for Long-term Agentic Memory
Long-term memory has become increasingly important for LLM agents that operate across extended interactions and evolving task contexts. Recent memory systems have made past experiences more persistent, compact, and retrievable, but retrieval alone does not ensure that a memory provides valid evidence for the current query. When experiences are compressed into reusable fragments, memories from different situations may appear equally relevant if they involve recurring entities or user states. We refer to this failure as context collapse: memories lose the surrounding context needed to judge whether they provide valid evidence for the current query. To address this problem, we propose Contextual Reinstatement for Agentic Memory (RaMem), a framework that turns retrieved memory fragments into contextually verifiable evidence. RaMem operates through four coordinated stages: (i) evidence anchoring grounds each memory in its original episodic conditions, especially event time, mention time, session span, and participants; (ii) recall condition induction derives the evidence conditions implied by the query; (iii) validity-aware retrieval uses these conditions to prioritize context-compatible memories while retaining content-relevant candidates as fallback evidence; and (iv) context-preserved synthesis keeps the selected memories' structured context available to the generator. Experiments on long-term memory benchmarks show that RaMem consistently improves performance over strong memory baselines, with average F1 gains of more than 10% across several backbones.
Defenses Against Prompt Attacks Learn Surface Heuristics
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in security-sensitive applications, where they must follow system- or developer-specified instructions that define the intended task behavior, while completing benign user requests. When adversarial instructions appear in user queries or externally retrieved content, models may override intended logic. Recent defenses rely on supervised fine-tuning with benign and malicious labels. Although these methods achieve high attack rejection rates, we find that they rely on narrow correlations in defense data rather than harmful intent, leading to systematic rejection of safe inputs. We analyze three recurring shortcut behaviors induced by defense fine-tuning. \emph{Position bias} arises when benign content placed later in a prompt is rejected at much higher rates; across reasoning benchmarks, suffix-task rejection rises from below \textbf{10\%} to as high as \textbf{90\%}. \emph{Token trigger bias} occurs when strings common in attack data raise rejection probability even in benign contexts; inserting a single trigger token increases false refusals by up to \textbf{50\%}. \emph{Topic generalization bias} reflects poor generalization beyond the defense data distribution, with defended models suffering test-time accuracy drops of up to \textbf{40\%}. These findings suggest that current prompt-injection defenses frequently respond to attack-like surface patterns rather than the underlying intent. We introduce controlled diagnostic datasets and a systematic evaluation across two base models and multiple defense pipelines, highlighting limitations of supervised fine-tuning for reliable LLM security.