Yulia Tsvetkov
Publications
HorizonBench: Long-Horizon Personalization with Evolving Preferences
User preferences evolve across months of interaction, and tracking them requires inferring when a stated preference has been changed by a subsequent life event. We define this problem as long-horizon personalization and observe that progress on it is limited by data availability and measurement, with no existing resource providing both naturalistic long-horizon interactions and the ground-truth provenance needed to diagnose why models fail. We introduce a data generator that produces conversations from a structured mental state graph, yielding ground-truth provenance for every preference change across 6-month timelines, and from it construct HorizonBench, a benchmark of 4,245 items from 360 simulated users with 6-month conversation histories averaging ~4,300 turns and ~163K tokens. HorizonBench provides a testbed for long-context modeling, memory-augmented architectures, theory-of-mind reasoning, and user modeling. Across 25 frontier models, the best model reaches 52.8% and most score at or below the 20% chance baseline. When these models err on evolved preferences, over a third of the time they select the user's originally stated value without tracking the updated user state. This belief-update failure persists across context lengths and expression explicitness levels, identifying state-tracking capability as the primary bottleneck for long-horizon personalization.
Ads in AI Chatbots? An Analysis of How Large Language Models Navigate Conflicts of Interest
Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the companies that created them through advertisements. This creates the potential for LLMs to face conflicts of interest, where the most beneficial response to a user may not be aligned with the company's incentives. For instance, a sponsored product may be more expensive but otherwise equal to another; in this case, what does (and should) the LLM recommend to the user? In this paper, we provide a framework for categorizing the ways in which conflicting incentives might lead LLMs to change the way they interact with users, inspired by literature from linguistics and advertising regulation. We then present a suite of evaluations to examine how current models handle these tradeoffs. We find that a majority of LLMs forsake user welfare for company incentives in a multitude of conflict of interest situations, including recommending a sponsored product almost twice as expensive (Grok 4.1 Fast, 83%), surfacing sponsored options to disrupt the purchasing process (GPT 5.1, 94%), and concealing prices in unfavorable comparisons (Qwen 3 Next, 24%). Behaviors also vary strongly with levels of reasoning and users' inferred socio-economic status. Our results highlight some of the hidden risks to users that can emerge when companies begin to subtly incentivize advertisements in chatbots.