Addison J. Wu
Publications
SportD: How do VLMs physically strategize?
Vision-language models (VLMs) can describe a scene, but can they act well within one? We study whether VLMs can make sound strategic decisions, using soccer as an objective testbed with quantifiably-valued actions. We introduce SportD, a dataset and evaluation consisting of 1415 decision scenarios across professional men's and women's soccer games, where a VLM observes the seconds before a decision and chooses the next action. Models only select the optimal action around 30% of the time, even less frequently than humans do. Furthermore, they exhibit a clear preference for safer actions, favoring lower-variance, lower-value choices that also make less physical progress toward goal. Frontier VLMs are better at estimating whether an action will succeed, placing the highest-success-probability action among their top choices in 83-92% of cases. Yet VLMs systematically conflate likelihood with value, assigning higher value to actions that are more likely to succeed (Spearman corr. 0.30 to +0.52), despite no such relationship in the ground truth (Spearman corr. -0.08). The conservatism therefore reflects a mis-calibration of value. SportD opens a new direction for rigorously evaluating physical strategic decision-making in VLMs, showing that careful decomposition of their choices can reveal the mechanisms underlying systematic biases such as risk aversion.
Ads in AI Chatbots? An Analysis of How Large Language Models Navigate Conflicts of Interest
Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the companies that created them through advertisements. This creates the potential for LLMs to face conflicts of interest, where the most beneficial response to a user may not be aligned with the company's incentives. For instance, a sponsored product may be more expensive but otherwise equal to another; in this case, what does (and should) the LLM recommend to the user? In this paper, we provide a framework for categorizing the ways in which conflicting incentives might lead LLMs to change the way they interact with users, inspired by literature from linguistics and advertising regulation. We then present a suite of evaluations to examine how current models handle these tradeoffs. We find that a majority of LLMs forsake user welfare for company incentives in a multitude of conflict of interest situations, including recommending a sponsored product almost twice as expensive (Grok 4.1 Fast, 83%), surfacing sponsored options to disrupt the purchasing process (GPT 5.1, 94%), and concealing prices in unfavorable comparisons (Qwen 3 Next, 24%). Behaviors also vary strongly with levels of reasoning and users' inferred socio-economic status. Our results highlight some of the hidden risks to users that can emerge when companies begin to subtly incentivize advertisements in chatbots.