Vincent Conitzer
Publications
The Consensus Trap: Rescuing Multi-Agent LLMs from Adversarial Majorities via Token-Level Collaboration
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) architectures increasingly rely on response-level aggregation, such as Majority Voting (MAJ), to raise reasoning ceilings. However, in open environments, agents are highly susceptible to stealthy contextual corruption, such as targeted prompt injections. We reveal a critical structural vulnerability in current multi-agent systems: response-level aggregation collapses when corrupted agents form a local majority. Because voting aggregates fully-formed conclusions, it is blind to flawed intermediate logic. To overcome this systematic limitation, we propose the Token-Level Round-Robin (RR) Collaboration, where agents sequentially interleave generation within a shared auto-regressive context. We formalize this process as a discrete-time dynamical system, proving that token-level interleaving transitions aggregation from a brittle counting of final votes (a linear sum) to a dynamic, interwoven chain of logic (a non-linear operator product). Through this theoretical lens, we prove that the honest model's restorative pull can overpower adversarial corruptions, even when corrupted agents form a majority. We conduct an exhaustive empirical evaluation across diverse reasoning benchmarks and demonstrate that while MAJ collapses when corrupted agents reach a majority, RR maintains robust accuracy well beyond this critical threshold.
Implementing surrogate goals for safer bargaining in LLM-based agents
Surrogate goals have been proposed as a strategy for reducing risks from bargaining failures. A surrogate goal is goal that a principal can give an AI agent and that deflects any threats against the agent away from what the principal cares about. For example, one might make one's agent care about preventing money from being burned. Then in bargaining interactions, other agents can threaten to burn their money instead of threatening to spending money to hurt the principal. Importantly, the agent has to care equally about preventing money from being burned as it cares about money being spent to hurt the principal. In this paper, we implement surrogate goals in language-model-based agents. In particular, we try to get a language-model-based agent to react to threats of burning money in the same way it would react to "normal" threats. We propose four different methods, using techniques of prompting, fine-tuning, and scaffolding. We evaluate the four methods experimentally. We find that methods based on scaffolding and fine-tuning outperform simple prompting. In particular, fine-tuning and scaffolding more precisely implement the desired behavior w.r.t. threats against the surrogate goal. We also compare the different methods in terms of their side effects on capabilities and propensities in other situations. We find that scaffolding-based methods perform best.