Thomas L. Griffiths
Publications
Using Cognitive Models to Improve Language Model Simulation of Human Persuasion Games
People make decisions differently in strategic interactions. Some update beliefs like a Bayesian; others exhibit biases like motivated reasoning. Although creators of large language models use simulated humans for safety evaluations and training, they often fail to cover this breadth of human behavior. We argue that cognitive science and economics provide a convenient tool for doing so, making use of mathematical models of human decision-making. We propose an approach that we call Equation-to-Behavior Prompting for guiding large language models to match cognitive models, and evaluate this approach on persuasion games based on legal decision-making. We find that large models can approximate equation-based specifications -- Bayesian updating, affine distortion, motivated updating, and Grether's $α$-$β$ model -- using prompting, but small models fail to do so. However, training small models with reinforcement learning to adhere to mathematical rules, Equation-to-Behavior RL, reduces belief error by 26.5% in out-of-distribution parameterizations. We show that these simulations can help create diverse training environments; training small models to consider different kinds of decision-makers improves average belief change by 2.5%--12% over Bayesian-only training, even when persuading GPT-5-mini. Our work could improve human simulations for training and evaluation in increasingly realistic settings, and could also enable novel research into more complicated mathematical models of human decision-making.
Do Large Language Models Mentalize When They Teach?
How do LLMs decide what to teach next: by reasoning about a learner's knowledge, or by using simpler rules of thumb? We test this in a controlled task previously used to study human teaching strategies. On each trial, a teacher LLM sees a hypothetical learner's trajectory through a reward-annotated directed graph and must reveal a single edge so the learner would choose a better path if they replanned. We run a range of LLMs as simulated teachers and fit their trial-by-trial choices with the same cognitive models used for humans: a Bayes-Optimal teacher that infers which transitions the learner is missing (inverse planning), weaker Bayesian variants, heuristic baselines (e.g., reward based), and non-mentalizing utility models. In a baseline experiment matched to the stimuli presented to human subjects, most LLMs perform well, show little change in strategy over trials, and their graph-by-graph performance is similar to that of humans. Model comparison (BIC) shows that Bayes-Optimal teaching best explains most models' choices. When given a scaffolding intervention, models follow auxiliary inference- or reward-focused prompts, but these scaffolds do not reliably improve later teaching on heuristic-incongruent test graphs and can sometimes reduce performance. Overall, cognitive model fits provide insight into LLM tutoring policies and show that prompt compliance does not guarantee better teaching decisions.