Simon T. Powers
Publications
Optimizing Appliance Scheduling for Solar Energy Management Using Metaheuristic Algorithms
Renewable energy is essential for meeting future energy demands; however, solar energy generation, which occurs only during daylight hours often does not align with household consumption patterns. Appliances such as cookers, washing machines, and dryers are typically operated according to user preferred schedules rather than solar energy availability, creating a scheduling optimization problem. The objective is to determine optimal appliance start times to maximize renewable energy utilization while minimizing user inconvenience and adhering to system constraints. This paper presents a metaheuristic approach using Iterated Local Search (ILS) and Simulated Annealing (SA) to optimize appliance start times, while considering appliance operating durations, power consumption, inverter limit, battery state of charge constraints, and solar generation forecasts. Unlike most existing work, the scheduling is extended beyond a single day to accommodate unfinished tasks from previous days (spillover), ensuring operational continuity and enabling sequential operation across multiple days. Experimental results show that the sequential multi-day scheduling framework effectively manages system constraints while ensuring user convenience under exclusive solar generation. These findings also open opportunities for future research on multi-objective trade-offs between investment in equipment of various sizes, return on that investment, and user satisfaction.
Trust as Monitoring: Evolutionary Dynamics of User Trust and AI Developer Behaviour
AI safety is an increasingly urgent concern as the capabilities and adoption of AI systems grow. Existing evolutionary models of AI governance have primarily examined incentives for safe development and effective regulation, typically representing users' trust as a one-shot adoption choice rather than as a dynamic, evolving process shaped by repeated interactions. We instead model trust as reduced monitoring in a repeated, asymmetric interaction between users and AI developers, where checking AI behaviour is costly. Using evolutionary game theory, we study how user trust strategies and developer choices between safe (compliant) and unsafe (non-compliant) AI co-evolve under different levels of monitoring cost and institutional regimes. We complement the infinite-population replicator analysis with stochastic finite-population dynamics and reinforcement learning (Q-learning) simulations. Across these approaches, we find three robust long-run regimes: no adoption with unsafe development, unsafe but widely adopted systems, and safe systems that are widely adopted. Only the last is desirable, and it arises when penalties for unsafe behaviour exceed the extra cost of safety and users can still afford to monitor at least occasionally. Our results formally support governance proposals that emphasise transparency, low-cost monitoring, and meaningful sanctions, and they show that neither regulation alone nor blind user trust is sufficient to prevent evolutionary drift towards unsafe or low-adoption outcomes.