Haotian Li
Publications
Social-R1: Towards Human-like Social Reasoning in LLMs
While large language models demonstrate remarkable capabilities across numerous domains, social intelligence - the capacity to perceive social cues, infer mental states, and generate appropriate responses - remains a critical challenge, particularly for enabling effective human-AI collaboration and developing AI that truly serves human needs. Current models often rely on superficial patterns rather than genuine social reasoning. We argue that cultivating human-like social intelligence requires training with challenging cases that resist shortcut solutions. To this end, we introduce ToMBench-Hard, an adversarial benchmark designed to provide hard training examples for social reasoning. Building on this, we propose Social-R1, a reinforcement learning framework that aligns model reasoning with human cognition through multi-dimensional rewards. Unlike outcome-based RL, Social-R1 supervises the entire reasoning process, enforcing structural alignment, logical integrity, and information density. Results show that our approach enables a 4B parameter model to surpass much larger counterparts and generalize robustly across eight diverse benchmarks. These findings demonstrate that challenging training cases with trajectory-level alignment offer a path toward efficient and reliable social intelligence.
To Think or Not To Think, That is The Question for Large Reasoning Models in Theory of Mind Tasks
Theory of Mind (ToM) assesses whether models can infer hidden mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, which is essential for natural social interaction. Although recent progress in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) has boosted step-by-step inference in mathematics and coding, it is still underexplored whether this benefit transfers to socio-cognitive skills. We present a systematic study of nine advanced Large Language Models (LLMs), comparing reasoning models with non-reasoning models on three representative ToM benchmarks. The results show that reasoning models do not consistently outperform non-reasoning models and sometimes perform worse. A fine-grained analysis reveals three insights. First, slow thinking collapses: accuracy significantly drops as responses grow longer, and larger reasoning budgets hurt performance. Second, moderate and adaptive reasoning benefits performance: constraining reasoning length mitigates failure, while distinct success patterns demonstrate the necessity of dynamic adaptation. Third, option matching shortcut: when multiple choice options are removed, reasoning models improve markedly, indicating reliance on option matching rather than genuine deduction. We also design two intervention approaches: Slow-to-Fast (S2F) adaptive reasoning and Think-to-Match (T2M) shortcut prevention to further verify and mitigate the problems. With all results, our study highlights the advancement of LRMs in formal reasoning (e.g., math, code) cannot be fully transferred to ToM, a typical task in social reasoning. We conclude that achieving robust ToM requires developing unique capabilities beyond existing reasoning methods.