Xiaoxiao Miao
Publications
Spectrogram features for audio and speech analysis
Spectrogram-based representations have grown to dominate the feature space for deep learning audio analysis systems, and are often adopted for speech analysis also. Initially, the primary motivator for spectrogram-based representations was their ability to present sound as a two dimensional signal in the time-frequency plane, which not only provides an interpretable physical basis for analysing sound, but also unlocks the use of a wide range of machine learning techniques such as convolutional neural networks, that had been developed for image processing. A spectrogram is a matrix characterised by the resolution and span of its two dimensions, as well as by the representation and scaling of each element. Many possibilities for these three characteristics have been explored by researchers across numerous application areas, with different settings showing affinity for various tasks. This paper reviews the use of spectrogram-based representations and surveys the state-of-the-art to question how front-end feature representation choice allies with back-end classifier architecture for different tasks.
DAST: A Dual-Stream Voice Anonymization Attacker with Staged Training
Voice anonymization masks vocal traits while preserving linguistic content, which may still leak speaker-specific patterns. To assess and strengthen privacy evaluation, we propose a dual-stream attacker that fuses spectral and self-supervised learning features via parallel encoders with a three-stage training strategy. Stage I establishes foundational speaker-discriminative representations. Stage II leverages the shared identity-transformation characteristics of voice conversion and anonymization, exposing the model to diverse converted speech to build cross-system robustness. Stage III provides lightweight adaptation to target anonymized data. Results on the VoicePrivacy Attacker Challenge (VPAC) dataset demonstrate that Stage II is the primary driver of generalization, enabling strong attacking performance on unseen anonymization datasets. With Stage III, fine-tuning on only 10\% of the target anonymization dataset surpasses current state-of-the-art attackers in terms of EER.