Zhiyu Xue
Publications
Counting Circuits: Mechanistic Interpretability of Visual Reasoning in Large Vision-Language Models
Counting serves as a simple but powerful test of a Large Vision-Language Model's (LVLM's) reasoning; it forces the model to identify each individual object and then add them all up. In this study, we investigate how LVLMs implement counting using controlled synthetic and real-world benchmarks, combined with mechanistic analyses. Our results show that LVLMs display a human-like counting behavior, with precise performance on small numerosities and noisy estimation for larger quantities. We introduce two novel interpretability methods, Visual Activation Patching and HeadLens, and use them to uncover a structured "counting circuit" that is largely shared across a variety of visual reasoning tasks. Building on these insights, we propose a lightweight intervention strategy that exploits simple and abundantly available synthetic images to fine-tune arbitrary pretrained LVLMs exclusively on counting. Despite the narrow scope of this fine-tuning, the intervention not only enhances counting accuracy on in-distribution synthetic data, but also yields an average improvement of +8.36% on out-of-distribution counting benchmarks and an average gain of +1.54% on complex, general visual reasoning tasks for Qwen2.5-VL. These findings highlight the central, influential role of counting in visual reasoning and suggest a potential pathway for improving overall visual reasoning capabilities through targeted enhancement of counting mechanisms.
Deactivating Refusal Triggers: Understanding and Mitigating Overrefusal in Safety Alignment
Safety alignment aims to ensure that large language models (LLMs) refuse harmful requests by post-training on harmful queries paired with refusal answers. Although safety alignment is widely adopted in industry, the overrefusal problem where aligned LLMs also reject benign queries after safety alignment post-training, remains insufficiently studied. Such an issue degrades the usability of safety alignment in real-world applications. In this paper, we examine how overrefusal arises under safety alignment, and propose a mitigation strategy inspired by our findings. We define refusal triggers as linguistic cues in the training data that elicit refusal responses, safety alignment encourages LLMs to associate refusal triggers within a training sample with refusal responses, leading aligned LLMs to refuse harmful queries. However, the refusal triggers include not only harmful linguistic cues but also non-harmful cues, therefore causing overrefusal to benign queries. Building on this mechanistic analysis, we propose a method that explicitly considers refusal triggers in the safety alignment fine-tuning. Empirical results demonstrate that our approach achieves a more favorable trade-off between defense against jailbreak attacks and responsiveness to benign queries, outperforming prior methods. Warning: this paper contains harmful and biased sentences.