Matthew Nguyen
Publications
On the Generalization of Steering Vectors for Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness
Model capabilities have improved in large part due to scaling chain of thought. This has been a promising development for AI safety--where models verbalize their reasoning, it is possible to monitor it. However, in some cases, models do not verbalize important steps in their reasoning process. For example, models prompted with a cue suggesting the incorrect answer may fail to acknowledge that cue, even when it appears instrumental to their conclusion. When chain of thought (CoT) fails to disclose instrumental reasoning steps, we describe it as unfaithful. Prior work has shown that activation steering can be a useful method to improve faithfulness in CoT. We extend this line of work by studying how well steering for faithfulness generalizes across cue types, datasets, and methods of constructing the steering vector for three models (Gemma-3 4B, Qwen-3.5 9B, Gemma-3 12B) in a cued question-answering setting. While steering reliably increases cue acknowledgment for only the largest model (Gemma-3 12B), we find that when steering is effective, its effect generalizes broadly across cue types and datasets--in cross-cue and cross-dataset analyses, effect size is determined primarily by the evaluation setting, rather than the vector's train setting. How the vector is built also matters little--four construction methods, including one whose optimization target mentions no specific cue, yield similar effect sizes. Finally, we consider the possibility that steering promotes the salience of the cue and causes greater cue use, rather than targeting verbalization behaviors. However, we find no evidence for this--steering leaves the rate of cue use roughly unchanged while reducing hidden cue use, i.e., cue use that is not acknowledged.
Are LLM Evaluators Really Narcissists? Sanity Checking Self-Preference Evaluations
Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) favor their own outputs when acting as judges, undermining the integrity of automated post-training and evaluation workflows. However, it is difficult to disentangle which evaluation biases are explained by narcissism versus general experimental confounds, distorting measurements of self-preference bias. We discover a core methodological confound which could reduce measurement error by 89.6%. Specifically, LLM evaluators may deliver self-preferring verdicts when the judge responds to queries which they completed incorrectly themselves; this would be true regardless of whether one of their responses is their own. To decouple self-preference signals from noisy outputs on hard problems, we introduce an Evaluator Quality Baseline, which compares the probability that a judge incorrectly votes for itself against the probability that it votes for an incorrect response from another model. Evaluating this simple baseline on 37,448 queries, only 51% of initial findings retain statistical significance. Finally, we turn towards characterizing the entropy of "easy" versus "hard" evaluation votes from LLM judges. Our corrective baseline enables future research on self-preference by eliminating noisy data from potential solutions. More widely, this work contributes to the growing body of work on cataloging and isolating judge-bias effects.