Tri Cao
Publications
AliMark: Enhancing Robustness of Sentence-Level Watermarking Against Text Paraphrasing
Existing sentence-level watermarking methods enhance robustness to paraphrasing by anchoring watermarks in sentence semantics. However, their prefix-based designs remain vulnerable to structural perturbations, such as sentence splitting and merging, which commonly arise under strong paraphrasers like DIPPER and GPT-3.5. To mitigate this issue, we propose AliMark, a framework that reformulates sentence-level watermarking as a bit sequence encoding and alignment problem between a potentially watermarked text and a secret bit sequence. Notably, our approach adopts a two-stage detection strategy: we generate multiple restructured text variants and adaptively align their extracted bit sequences with the secret bit sequence to minimize alignment cost. This multi-candidate alignment design naturally improves robustness to sentence merges and splits. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AliMark substantially outperforms state-of-the-art baselines under diverse paraphrasing attacks.
WARD: Adversarially Robust Defense of Web Agents Against Prompt Injections
Web agents can autonomously complete online tasks by interacting with websites, but their exposure to open web environments makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks embedded in HTML content or visual interfaces. Existing guard models still suffer from limited generalization to unseen domains and attack patterns, high false positive rates on benign content, reduced deployment efficiency due to added latency at each step, and vulnerability to adversarial attacks that evolve over time or directly target the guard itself. To address these limitations, we propose WARD (Web Agent Robust Defense against Prompt Injection), a practical guard model for secure and efficient web agents. WARD is built on WARD-Base, a large-scale dataset with around 177K samples collected from 719 high-traffic URLs and platforms, and WARD-PIG, a dedicated dataset designed for prompt injection attacks targeting the guard model. We further introduce A3T, an adaptive adversarial attack training framework that iteratively strengthens WARD through a memory-based attacker and guard co-evolution process. Extensive experiments show that WARD achieves nearly perfect recall on out-of-distribution benchmarks, maintains low false positive rates to preserve agent utility, remains robust against guard-targeted and adaptive attacks under substantial distribution shifts, and runs efficiently in parallel with the agent without introducing additional latency.
Just-In-Time Reinforcement Learning: Continual Learning in LLM Agents Without Gradient Updates
While Large Language Model (LLM) agents excel at general tasks, they inherently struggle with continual adaptation due to the frozen weights after deployment. Conventional reinforcement learning (RL) offers a solution but incurs prohibitive computational costs and the risk of catastrophic forgetting. We introduce Just-In-Time Reinforcement Learning (JitRL), a training-free framework that enables test-time policy optimization without any gradient updates. JitRL maintains a dynamic, non-parametric memory of experiences and retrieves relevant trajectories to estimate action advantages on-the-fly. These estimates are then used to directly modulate the LLM's output logits. We theoretically prove that this additive update rule is the exact closed-form solution to the KL-constrained policy optimization objective. Extensive experiments on WebArena and Jericho demonstrate that JitRL establishes a new state-of-the-art among training-free methods. Crucially, JitRL outperforms the performance of computationally expensive fine-tuning methods (e.g., WebRL) while reducing monetary costs by over 30 times, offering a scalable path for continual learning agents. The code is available at https://github.com/liushiliushi/JitRL.