M. Russinovich
Famous AuthorPublications
Phantom References: Hallucinated Citations That Survive Peer Review at Top-Tier Conferences
Large language models can generate polished scientific text that includes unsupported claims, allowing hallucinations to enter the archival record. Assessing this risk via technical statements is difficult and often requires expert judgment, but citations provide a more auditable surface: a reference either resolves to a real scholarly work with compatible authorship, or it does not. We measure citation hallucination in peer-reviewed proceedings using a conservative definition limited to identity-level failures: non-existent works and substantial author-list mismatches. We explicitly exclude ordinary bibliographic drift (e.g., venue/year differences, publication-status updates, minor name variants). To audit citations at scale, we build RefChecker, a verification pipeline that resolves bibliography entries against multiple bibliographic sources and escalates unresolved cases to web-search re-verification. We apply RefChecker to accepted camera-ready papers from ICLR, ICML, NeurIPS, and USENIX Security. Hallucinated citations have entered the archival record. While reference-level rates are usually below 1%, proceedings are large enough that paper-level failures are visible: in 2025, roughly one in twenty NeurIPS and USENIX Security papers contains at least two likely hallucinated academic-paper-like references under our strict definition. We also observe post-ChatGPT increases in several venues, including a tail of papers with 5+ failures in a single bibliography, and likely hallucinated citations even among award-winning papers. These results suggest peer review alone does not reliably enforce citation integrity, yet auditing is tractable (about 0.04$ per paper in one venue-scale scan). We open-source RefChecker for routine, reproducible citation verification before publication (https://github.com/markrussinovich/refchecker).
Learning to Attack and Defend: Adaptive Red Teaming of Language Models via GRPO
AI red teaming must continually adapt to evolving attackers and defenders. Reinforcement learning offers a promising approach to discovering novel attacks, and co-training methods can produce more robust defenders in tandem. Recent works have demonstrated the efficacy of attacker-defender co-training by applying PPO and DPO, but report that GRPO is unstable in this setting. We introduce AdvGRPO, a co-training framework that makes GRPO viable for joint attacker-defender optimization using dense multi-channel rewards and decoupled advantage normalization. Training progresses through a curriculum from single-turn to closed-loop multi-turn attacks before bootstrapping co-training, where attacker and defender models are updated in alternation. We show that our method can produce highly effective and transferable attacks and that co-trained defenders outperform baselines on safety benchmarks.
GRP-Obliteration: Unaligning LLMs With a Single Unlabeled Prompt
Safety alignment is only as robust as its weakest failure mode. Despite extensive work on safety post-training, it has been shown that models can be readily unaligned through post-deployment fine-tuning. However, these methods often require extensive data curation and degrade model utility. In this work, we extend the practical limits of unalignment by introducing GRP-Obliteration (GRP-Oblit), a method that uses Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to directly remove safety constraints from target models. We show that a single unlabeled prompt is sufficient to reliably unalign safety-aligned models while largely preserving their utility, and that GRP-Oblit achieves stronger unalignment on average than existing state-of-the-art techniques. Moreover, GRP-Oblit generalizes beyond language models and can also unalign diffusion-based image generation systems. We evaluate GRP-Oblit on six utility benchmarks and five safety benchmarks across fifteen 7-20B parameter models, spanning instruct and reasoning models, as well as dense and MoE architectures. The evaluated model families include GPT-OSS, distilled DeepSeek, Gemma, Llama, Ministral, and Qwen.