Brian Christian
Publications
Reward Models Inherit Value Biases from Pretraining
Reward models (RMs) are central to aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values but have received less attention than pretrained and post-trained LLMs themselves. Because RMs are initialized from LLMs, they inherit representations that shape their behavior, but the nature and extent of this influence remain understudied. In a comprehensive study of 10 leading open-weight RMs using validated psycholinguistic corpora, we show that RMs exhibit significant differences along multiple dimensions of human value as a function of their base model. Using the "Big Two" psychological axes, we show a robust preference of Llama RMs for "agency" and a corresponding robust preference of Gemma RMs for "communion." This phenomenon holds even when the preference data and finetuning process are identical, and we trace it back to the logits of the respective instruction-tuned and pretrained models. These log-probability differences themselves can be formulated as an implicit RM; we derive usable implicit reward scores and show that they exhibit the very same agency/communion difference. We run experiments training RMs with ablations for preference data source and quantity, which demonstrate that this effect is not only repeatable but surprisingly durable. Despite RMs being designed to represent human preferences, our evidence shows that their outputs are influenced by the pretrained LLMs on which they are based. This work underscores the importance of safety and alignment efforts at the pretraining stage, and makes clear that open-source developers' choice of base model is as much a consideration of values as of performance.
Self-Blinding and Counterfactual Self-Simulation Mitigate Biases and Sycophancy in Large Language Models
Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.