Xingjun Ma
Publications
Adversarial Orthogonal Disentanglement for LVLM Hallucination Mitigation
Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have advanced multimodal understanding, yet their reliability is limited by hallucination, where generated content conflicts with visual facts. Existing mitigation methods either rely on costly external interventions, such as instruction tuning and retrieval, or use internal mechanisms that remain limited by flawed attention weights and entangled hidden representations. We propose Adversarial Orthogonal Disentanglement (AOD), a latent geometric framework for mitigating LVLM hallucinations. AOD learns a hallucination-related direction through a minimax objective: a classifier concentrates hallucination signals into the projected component, while an adversary removes them from the orthogonal residual space via a Gradient Reversal Layer. The learned direction enables a training-free dual-forward-pass contrastive decoding strategy that suppresses hallucinations while preserving general capabilities. Experiments on three LVLMs across four hallucination and four utility benchmarks show that AOD consistently outperforms strong baselines. It improves POPE accuracy by over 6\% on average, boosts AMBER by 6\%, and maintains strong performance on utility tasks such as MMMU. Further analysis shows robust transfer across datasets, suggesting that AOD captures general hallucination-related biases rather than dataset-specific artifacts. Our source code and datasets are available at https://github.com/Hunter-Wrynn/AOD.
A Safety Report on GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5
The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has driven major gains in reasoning, perception, and generation across language and vision, yet whether these advances translate into comparable improvements in safety remains unclear, partly due to fragmented evaluations that focus on isolated modalities or threat models. In this report, we present an integrated safety evaluation of six frontier models--GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5--assessing each across language, vision-language, and image generation using a unified protocol that combines benchmark, adversarial, multilingual, and compliance evaluations. By aggregating results into safety leaderboards and model profiles, we reveal a highly uneven safety landscape: while GPT-5.2 demonstrates consistently strong and balanced performance, other models exhibit clear trade-offs across benchmark safety, adversarial robustness, multilingual generalization, and regulatory compliance. Despite strong results under standard benchmarks, all models remain highly vulnerable under adversarial testing, with worst-case safety rates dropping below 6%. Text-to-image models show slightly stronger alignment in regulated visual risk categories, yet remain fragile when faced with adversarial or semantically ambiguous prompts. Overall, these findings highlight that safety in frontier models is inherently multidimensional--shaped by modality, language, and evaluation design--underscoring the need for standardized, holistic safety assessments to better reflect real-world risk and guide responsible deployment.