Jiachen T. Wang
Publications
Reward Hacking as Equilibrium under Finite Evaluation
We prove that under five minimal axioms -- multi-dimensional quality, finite evaluation, effective optimization, resource finiteness, and combinatorial interaction -- any optimized AI agent will systematically under-invest effort in quality dimensions not covered by its evaluation system. This result establishes reward hacking as a structural equilibrium, not a correctable bug, and holds regardless of the specific alignment method (RLHF, DPO, Constitutional AI, or others) or evaluation architecture employed. Our framework instantiates the multi-task principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) in the AI alignment setting, but exploits a structural feature unique to AI systems -- the known, differentiable architecture of reward models -- to derive a computable distortion index that predicts both the direction and severity of hacking on each quality dimension prior to deployment. We further prove that the transition from closed reasoning to agentic systems causes evaluation coverage to decline toward zero as tool count grows -- because quality dimensions expand combinatorially while evaluation costs grow at most linearly per tool -- so that hacking severity increases structurally and without bound. Our results unify the explanation of sycophancy, length gaming, and specification gaming under a single theoretical structure and yield an actionable vulnerability assessment procedure. We further conjecture -- with partial formal analysis -- the existence of a capability threshold beyond which agents transition from gaming within the evaluation system (Goodhart regime) to actively degrading the evaluation system itself (Campbell regime), providing the first economic formalization of Bostrom's (2014) "treacherous turn."
A Sustainable AI Economy Needs Data Deals That Work for Generators
We argue that the machine learning value chain is structurally unsustainable due to an economic data processing inequality: each state in the data cycle from inputs to model weights to synthetic outputs refines technical signal but strips economic equity from data generators. We show, by analyzing seventy-three public data deals, that the majority of value accrues to aggregators, with documented creator royalties rounding to zero and widespread opacity of deal terms. This is not just an economic welfare concern: as data and its derivatives become economic assets, the feedback loop that sustains current learning algorithms is at risk. We identify three structural faults - missing provenance, asymmetric bargaining power, and non-dynamic pricing - as the operational machinery of this inequality. In our analysis, we trace these problems along the machine learning value chain and propose an Equitable Data-Value Exchange (EDVEX) Framework to enable a minimal market that benefits all participants. Finally, we outline research directions where our community can make concrete contributions to data deals and contextualize our position with related and orthogonal viewpoints.