Z

Zhenyi Wang

Total Citations
51
h-index
5
Papers
2

Publications

#1 2603.24857v1 Mar 25, 2026

AI Security in the Foundation Model Era: A Comprehensive Survey from a Unified Perspective

As machine learning (ML) systems expand in both scale and functionality, the security landscape has become increasingly complex, with a proliferation of attacks and defenses. However, existing studies largely treat these threats in isolation, lacking a coherent framework to expose their shared principles and interdependencies. This fragmented view hinders systematic understanding and limits the design of comprehensive defenses. Crucially, the two foundational assets of ML -- \textbf{data} and \textbf{models} -- are no longer independent; vulnerabilities in one directly compromise the other. The absence of a holistic framework leaves open questions about how these bidirectional risks propagate across the ML pipeline. To address this critical gap, we propose a \emph{unified closed-loop threat taxonomy} that explicitly frames model-data interactions along four directional axes. Our framework offers a principled lens for analyzing and defending foundation models. The resulting four classes of security threats represent distinct but interrelated categories of attacks: (1) Data$\rightarrow$Data (D$\rightarrow$D): including \emph{data decryption attacks and watermark removal attacks}; (2) Data$\rightarrow$Model (D$\rightarrow$M): including \emph{poisoning, harmful fine-tuning attacks, and jailbreak attacks}; (3) Model$\rightarrow$Data (M$\rightarrow$D): including \emph{model inversion, membership inference attacks, and training data extraction attacks}; (4) Model$\rightarrow$Model (M$\rightarrow$M): including \emph{model extraction attacks}. Our unified framework elucidates the underlying connections among these security threats and establishes a foundation for developing scalable, transferable, and cross-modal security strategies, particularly within the landscape of foundation models.

Zhenyi Wang Siyu Luan
1 Citations
#2 2601.10880v1 Jan 15, 2026

Medical SAM3: A Foundation Model for Universal Prompt-Driven Medical Image Segmentation

Promptable segmentation foundation models such as SAM3 have demonstrated strong generalization capabilities through interactive and concept-based prompting. However, their direct applicability to medical image segmentation remains limited by severe domain shifts, the absence of privileged spatial prompts, and the need to reason over complex anatomical and volumetric structures. Here we present Medical SAM3, a foundation model for universal prompt-driven medical image segmentation, obtained by fully fine-tuning SAM3 on large-scale, heterogeneous 2D and 3D medical imaging datasets with paired segmentation masks and text prompts. Through a systematic analysis of vanilla SAM3, we observe that its performance degrades substantially on medical data, with its apparent competitiveness largely relying on strong geometric priors such as ground-truth-derived bounding boxes. These findings motivate full model adaptation beyond prompt engineering alone. By fine-tuning SAM3's model parameters on 33 datasets spanning 10 medical imaging modalities, Medical SAM3 acquires robust domain-specific representations while preserving prompt-driven flexibility. Extensive experiments across organs, imaging modalities, and dimensionalities demonstrate consistent and significant performance gains, particularly in challenging scenarios characterized by semantic ambiguity, complex morphology, and long-range 3D context. Our results establish Medical SAM3 as a universal, text-guided segmentation foundation model for medical imaging and highlight the importance of holistic model adaptation for achieving robust prompt-driven segmentation under severe domain shift. Code and model will be made available at https://github.com/AIM-Research-Lab/Medical-SAM3.

Yihua Shao Chongcong Jiang Tianxingjian Ding Chuhan Song Jiachen Tu +5
8 Citations