Francesco Giannini
Publications
Mixture of Concept Bottleneck Experts
Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) promote interpretability by grounding predictions in human-understandable concepts. However, existing CBMs typically fix their task predictor to a single linear or Boolean expression, limiting both predictive accuracy and adaptability to diverse user needs. We propose Mixture of Concept Bottleneck Experts (M-CBEs), a framework that generalizes existing CBMs along two dimensions: the number of experts and the functional form of each expert, exposing an underexplored region of the design space. We investigate this region by instantiating two novel models: Linear M-CBE, which learns a finite set of linear expressions, and Symbolic M-CBE, which leverages symbolic regression to discover expert functions from data under user-specified operator vocabularies. Empirical evaluation demonstrates that varying the mixture size and functional form provides a robust framework for navigating the accuracy-interpretability trade-off, adapting to different user and task needs.
Position: Explaining Behavioral Shifts in Large Language Models Requires a Comparative Approach
Large-scale foundation models exhibit behavioral shifts: intervention-induced behavioral changes that appear after scaling, fine-tuning, reinforcement learning or in-context learning. While investigating these phenomena have recently received attention, explaining their appearance is still overlooked. Classic explainable AI (XAI) methods can surface failures at a single checkpoint of a model, but they are structurally ill-suited to justify what changed internally across different checkpoints and which explanatory claims are warranted about that change. We take the position that behavioral shifts should be explained comparatively: the core target should be the intervention-induced shift between a reference model and an intervened model, rather than any single model in isolation. To this aim we formulate a Comparative XAI ($Δ$-XAI) framework with a set of desiderata to be taken into account when designing proper explaining methods. To highlight how $Δ$-XAI methods work, we introduce a set of possible pipelines, relate them to the desiderata, and provide a concrete $Δ$-XAI experiment.
Actionable Interpretability Must Be Defined in Terms of Symmetries
This paper argues that interpretability research in Artificial Intelligence is fundamentally ill-posed as existing definitions of interpretability are not *actionable*: they fail to provide formal principles from which concrete modelling and inferential rules can be derived. We posit that for a definition of interpretability to be actionable, it must be given in terms of *symmetries*. We hypothesise that four symmetries suffice to (i) motivate core interpretability properties, (ii) characterize the class of interpretable models, and (iii) derive a unified formulation of interpretable inference (e.g., alignment, interventions, and counterfactuals) as a form of Bayesian inversion.
Actionable Interpretability Must Be Defined in Terms of Symmetries
This paper argues that interpretability research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) is fundamentally ill-posed as existing definitions of interpretability fail to describe how interpretability can be formally tested or designed for. We posit that actionable definitions of interpretability must be formulated in terms of *symmetries* that inform model design and lead to testable conditions. Under a probabilistic view, we hypothesise that four symmetries (inference equivariance, information invariance, concept-closure invariance, and structural invariance) suffice to (i) formalise interpretable models as a subclass of probabilistic models, (ii) yield a unified formulation of interpretable inference (e.g., alignment, interventions, and counterfactuals) as a form of Bayesian inversion, and (iii) provide a formal framework to verify compliance with safety standards and regulations.