Pietro Barbiero
Publications
Prototype-Grounded Concept Models for Verifiable Concept Alignment
Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) aim to improve interpretability in Deep Learning by structuring predictions through human-understandable concepts, but they provide no way to verify whether learned concepts align with the human's intended meaning, hurting interpretability. We introduce Prototype-Grounded Concept Models (PGCMs), which ground concepts in learned visual prototypes: image parts that serve as explicit evidence for the concepts. This grounding enables direct inspection of concept semantics and supports targeted human intervention at the prototype level to correct misalignments. Empirically, PGCMs match the predictive performance of state-of-the-art CBMs while substantially improving transparency, interpretability, and intervenability.
Mixture of Concept Bottleneck Experts
Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) promote interpretability by grounding predictions in human-understandable concepts. However, existing CBMs typically fix their task predictor to a single linear or Boolean expression, limiting both predictive accuracy and adaptability to diverse user needs. We propose Mixture of Concept Bottleneck Experts (M-CBEs), a framework that generalizes existing CBMs along two dimensions: the number of experts and the functional form of each expert, exposing an underexplored region of the design space. We investigate this region by instantiating two novel models: Linear M-CBE, which learns a finite set of linear expressions, and Symbolic M-CBE, which leverages symbolic regression to discover expert functions from data under user-specified operator vocabularies. Empirical evaluation demonstrates that varying the mixture size and functional form provides a robust framework for navigating the accuracy-interpretability trade-off, adapting to different user and task needs.
Actionable Interpretability Must Be Defined in Terms of Symmetries
This paper argues that interpretability research in Artificial Intelligence is fundamentally ill-posed as existing definitions of interpretability are not *actionable*: they fail to provide formal principles from which concrete modelling and inferential rules can be derived. We posit that for a definition of interpretability to be actionable, it must be given in terms of *symmetries*. We hypothesise that four symmetries suffice to (i) motivate core interpretability properties, (ii) characterize the class of interpretable models, and (iii) derive a unified formulation of interpretable inference (e.g., alignment, interventions, and counterfactuals) as a form of Bayesian inversion.
Actionable Interpretability Must Be Defined in Terms of Symmetries
This paper argues that interpretability research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) is fundamentally ill-posed as existing definitions of interpretability fail to describe how interpretability can be formally tested or designed for. We posit that actionable definitions of interpretability must be formulated in terms of *symmetries* that inform model design and lead to testable conditions. Under a probabilistic view, we hypothesise that four symmetries (inference equivariance, information invariance, concept-closure invariance, and structural invariance) suffice to (i) formalise interpretable models as a subclass of probabilistic models, (ii) yield a unified formulation of interpretable inference (e.g., alignment, interventions, and counterfactuals) as a form of Bayesian inversion, and (iii) provide a formal framework to verify compliance with safety standards and regulations.