Amirali Abdullah
Publications
Curveball Steering: The Right Direction To Steer Isn't Always Linear
Activation steering is a widely used approach for controlling large language model (LLM) behavior by intervening on internal representations. Existing methods largely rely on the Linear Representation Hypothesis, assuming behavioral attributes can be manipulated using global linear directions. In practice, however, such linear interventions often behave inconsistently. We question this assumption by analyzing the intrinsic geometry of LLM activation spaces. Measuring geometric distortion via the ratio of geodesic to Euclidean distances, we observe substantial and concept-dependent distortions, indicating that activation spaces are not well-approximated by a globally linear geometry. Motivated by this, we propose "Curveball steering", a nonlinear steering method based on polynomial kernel PCA that performs interventions in a feature space, better respecting the learned activation geometry. Curveball steering consistently outperforms linear PCA-based steering, particularly in regimes exhibiting strong geometric distortion, suggesting that geometry-aware, nonlinear steering provides a principled alternative to global, linear interventions.
Understanding and Mitigating Dataset Corruption in LLM Steering
Contrastive steering has been shown as a simple and effective method to adjust the generative behavior of LLMs at inference time. It uses examples of prompt responses with and without a trait to identify a direction in an intermediate activation layer, and then shifts activations in this 1-dimensional subspace. However, despite its growing use in AI safety applications, the robustness of contrastive steering to noisy or adversarial data corruption is poorly understood. We initiate a study of the robustness of this process with respect to corruption of the dataset of examples used to train the steering direction. Our first observation is that contrastive steering is quite robust to a moderate amount of corruption, but unwanted side effects can be clearly and maliciously manifested when a non-trivial fraction of the training data is altered. Second, we analyze the geometry of various types of corruption, and identify some safeguards. Notably, a key step in learning the steering direction involves high-dimensional mean computation, and we show that replacing this step with a recently developed robust mean estimator often mitigates most of the unwanted effects of malicious corruption.