Kyle Mahowald
Publications
The Counterexample Game: Iterated Conceptual Analysis and Repair in Language Models
Conceptual analysis -- proposing definitions and refining them through counterexamples -- is central to philosophical methodology. We study whether language models can perform this task through iterated analysis and repair chains: one model instance generates counterexamples to a proposed definition, another repairs the definition, and the process repeats. Across 20 concepts and thousands of counterexample-repair cycles, we find that, although many LM-generated counterexamples are judged invalid by both expert humans and an LM judge, the LM judge accepts roughly twice as many as humans do. Nonetheless, per-item validity judgments are moderately consistent across humans and between humans and the LM. We further find that extended iteration produces increasingly verbose definitions without improving accuracy. We also see that some concepts resist stable definitions in general. These findings suggest that while LMs can engage in philosophical reasoning, the counterexample-repair loop hits diminishing returns quickly and could be a fruitful test case for evaluating whether LMs can sustain high-level iterated philosophical reasoning.
Dissociating Direct Access from Inference in AI Introspection
Introspection is a foundational cognitive ability, but its mechanism is not well understood. Recent work has shown that AI models can introspect. We study their mechanism of introspection, first extensively replicating Lindsey et al. (2025)'s thought injection detection paradigm in large open-source models. We show that these models detect injected representations via two separable mechanisms: (i) probability-matching (inferring from perceived anomaly of the prompt) and (ii) direct access to internal states. The direct access mechanism is content-agnostic: models detect that an anomaly occurred but cannot reliably identify its semantic content. The two model classes we study confabulate injected concepts that are high-frequency and concrete (e.g., "apple'"); for them correct concept guesses typically require significantly more tokens. This content-agnostic introspective mechanism is consistent with leading theories in philosophy and psychology.
Mechanisms of Prompt-Induced Hallucination in Vision-Language Models
Large vision-language models (VLMs) are highly capable, yet often hallucinate by favoring textual prompts over visual evidence. We study this failure mode in a controlled object-counting setting, where the prompt overstates the number of objects in the image (e.g., asking a model to describe four waterlilies when only three are present). At low object counts, models often correct the overestimation, but as the number of objects increases, they increasingly conform to the prompt regardless of the discrepancy. Through mechanistic analysis of three VLMs, we identify a small set of attention heads whose ablation substantially reduces prompt-induced hallucinations (PIH) by at least 40% without additional training. Across models, PIH-heads mediate prompt copying in model-specific ways. We characterize these differences and show that PIH ablation increases correction toward visual evidence. Our findings offer insights into the internal mechanisms driving prompt-induced hallucinations, revealing model-specific differences in how these behaviors are implemented.