Dan Hendrycks
Publications
TLPO: Token-Level Policy Optimization for Mitigating Language Confusion in Large Language Models
Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong multilingual capabilities, yet often fail to consistently generate responses in the intended language, exhibiting a phenomenon known as language confusion. Prior mitigation approaches based on sequence-level fine-tuning, such as DPO, ORPO, and GRPO, operate at the level of entire responses and can lead to unintended degradation of general model capabilities, motivating the need for more fine-grained alternatives. To address this, we introduce Token-Level Policy Optimization (TLPO), a fine-tuning framework designed to mitigate language confusion through localized, token-level updates. TLPO identifies error-prone positions, explores alternative candidate tokens, and updates the policy using a tailored objective to suppress error-inducing outputs at a granular level. This selective intervention enables effective mitigation of language confusion without compromising the model's general abilities. Experiments on multiple multilingual LLMs across diverse languages demonstrate that TLPO significantly outperforms baselines in improving language consistency while preserving downstream task accuracy.
Aggressive Compression Enables LLM Weight Theft
As frontier AIs become more powerful and costly to develop, adversaries have increasing incentives to steal model weights by mounting exfiltration attacks. In this work, we consider exfiltration attacks where an adversary attempts to sneak model weights out of a datacenter over a network. While exfiltration attacks are multi-step cyber attacks, we demonstrate that a single factor, the compressibility of model weights, significantly heightens exfiltration risk for large language models (LLMs). We tailor compression specifically for exfiltration by relaxing decompression constraints and demonstrate that attackers could achieve 16x to 100x compression with minimal trade-offs, reducing the time it would take for an attacker to illicitly transmit model weights from the defender's server from months to days. Finally, we study defenses designed to reduce exfiltration risk in three distinct ways: making models harder to compress, making them harder to 'find,' and tracking provenance for post-attack analysis using forensic watermarks. While all defenses are promising, the forensic watermark defense is both effective and cheap, and therefore is a particularly attractive lever for mitigating weight-exfiltration risk.