Junyao Yang
Publications
Recursive Synthesis for Long-Horizon Terminal Tasks
High-quality long-horizon training data for terminal agents is expensive to produce, often costing hundreds to thousands of dollars per task, because each task must keep the instruction, environment, reference solution, and verifier mutually consistent. Human authoring does not scale, and direct generation with large language models (LLMs) often breaks these dependencies. We present Recursive Synthetic Terminal Tasks (RST), a recursive verified synthesis framework for constructing long-horizon terminal-agent tasks at scale. Starting from verified seed tasks, RST extends the reference solution, realigns the verifier and instruction to the new workflow, validates the result in a fresh sandbox, and reuses accepted tasks as seeds for subsequent rounds. Across fifteen recursive rounds, RST produces 37,484 synthesized terminal-agent tasks at roughly $0.05 per task. Task difficulty increases substantially over rounds: the median reference solution grows from 67 to 374 lines, the median number of executed commands grows from 40 to 244, and DeepSeek-V4-Pro pass@4 drops from 90% at R1 to 2.5% at R15. To demonstrate training utility, we collect rejection-sampled Qwen3.5 trajectories on the synthesized tasks and use them for supervised fine-tuning. Fine-tuning on these trajectories improves Qwen3.5-27B and Qwen3.5-122B-A10B by up to 10 points on Terminal-Bench 2, Terminal-Bench Hard, and Long-Horizon Terminal Bench, while agentic PPO lifts Qwen3.5-27B to 49.44%, 32.00%, and 22.07% on the three benchmarks, corresponding to relative gains of 20.0%, 41.2%, and 21.9% over the base model. Moreover, after 15 rounds, the recursion shows no ceiling: synthesis yield and validation rates remain stable as difficulty keeps climbing, indicating that the process can continue well beyond the scale reported here.
AgentDoG: A Diagnostic Guardrail Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security
The rise of AI agents introduces complex safety and security challenges arising from autonomous tool use and environmental interactions. Current guardrail models lack agentic risk awareness and transparency in risk diagnosis. To introduce an agentic guardrail that covers complex and numerous risky behaviors, we first propose a unified three-dimensional taxonomy that orthogonally categorizes agentic risks by their source (where), failure mode (how), and consequence (what). Guided by this structured and hierarchical taxonomy, we introduce a new fine-grained agentic safety benchmark (ATBench) and a Diagnostic Guardrail framework for agent safety and security (AgentDoG). AgentDoG provides fine-grained and contextual monitoring across agent trajectories. More Crucially, AgentDoG can diagnose the root causes of unsafe actions and seemingly safe but unreasonable actions, offering provenance and transparency beyond binary labels to facilitate effective agent alignment. AgentDoG variants are available in three sizes (4B, 7B, and 8B parameters) across Qwen and Llama model families. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that AgentDoG achieves state-of-the-art performance in agentic safety moderation in diverse and complex interactive scenarios. All models and datasets are openly released.
The Why Behind the Action: Unveiling Internal Drivers via Agentic Attribution
Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are widely used in real-world applications such as customer service, web navigation, and software engineering. As these systems become more autonomous and are deployed at scale, understanding why an agent takes a particular action becomes increasingly important for accountability and governance. However, existing research predominantly focuses on \textit{failure attribution} to localize explicit errors in unsuccessful trajectories, which is insufficient for explaining \textbf{the reason behind agent behaviors}. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel framework for \textbf{general agentic attribution}, designed to identify the internal factors driving agent actions regardless of the task outcome. Our framework operates hierarchically to manage the complexity of agent interactions. Specifically, at the \textit{component level}, we employ temporal likelihood dynamics to identify critical interaction steps; then at the \textit{sentence level}, we refine this localization using perturbation-based analysis to isolate the specific textual evidence. We validate our framework across a diverse suite of agentic scenarios, including standard tool use and subtle reliability risks like memory-induced bias. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework reliably pinpoints pivotal historical events and sentences behind the agent behavior, offering a critical step toward safer and more accountable agentic systems. Codes are available at https://github.com/AI45Lab/AgentDoG.
ReasonAny: Incorporating Reasoning Capability to Any Model via Simple and Effective Model Merging
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) with long chain-of-thought reasoning have recently achieved remarkable success. Yet, equipping domain-specialized models with such reasoning capabilities, referred to as "Reasoning + X", remains a significant challenge. While model merging offers a promising training-free solution, existing methods often suffer from a destructive performance collapse: existing methods tend to both weaken reasoning depth and compromise domain-specific utility. Interestingly, we identify a counter-intuitive phenomenon underlying this failure: reasoning ability predominantly resides in parameter regions with low gradient sensitivity, contrary to the common assumption that domain capabilities correspond to high-magnitude parameters. Motivated by this insight, we propose ReasonAny, a novel merging framework that resolves the reasoning-domain performance collapse through Contrastive Gradient Identification. Experiments across safety, biomedicine, and finance domains show that ReasonAny effectively synthesizes "Reasoning + X" capabilities, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art baselines while retaining robust reasoning performance.