Yan Dai
Publications
Market Design for AI: Beyond the Copyright Binary
How can we design a market of human-generated content for use in training AI models that both enables technological progress and preserves individual incentives for high-quality content creation? Existing approaches take polar positions: a "free-for-all" model based on fair use and a "strong intellectual property rights" model. We show that both fail: Free-for-all does not compensate creators, and -- by modeling as a static Stackelberg game -- strong intellectual property rights also underpower creative incentives. We find this especially true for more innovative creators, a phenomenon we term the "originality penalty." Extending this insight to a dynamic model, we find another market failure undermining AI model performance, even for an initially good model: Such a model induces greater reliance by humans on AI-assisted creation, resulting in homogenized content feeding back into training, which degrades the model performance -- a "curse of precision." We further propose a market design with a data intermediary internalizing cross-creator externalities and subsidizing innovative contributions, thereby restoring efficiency.
Efficient Morphology-Control Co-Design via Stackelberg Proximal Policy Optimization
Morphology-control co-design concerns the coupled optimization of an agent's body structure and control policy. This problem exhibits a bi-level structure, where the control dynamically adapts to the morphology to maximize performance. Existing methods typically neglect the control's adaptation dynamics by adopting a single-level formulation that treats the control policy as fixed when optimizing morphology. This can lead to inefficient optimization, as morphology updates may be misaligned with control adaptation. In this paper, we revisit the co-design problem from a game-theoretic perspective, modeling the intrinsic coupling between morphology and control as a novel variant of a Stackelberg game. We propose Stackelberg Proximal Policy Optimization (Stackelberg PPO), which explicitly incorporates the control's adaptation dynamics into morphology optimization. By modeling this intrinsic coupling, our method aligns morphology updates with control adaptation, thereby stabilizing training and improving learning efficiency. Experiments across diverse co-design tasks demonstrate that Stackelberg PPO outperforms standard PPO in both stability and final performance, opening the way for dramatically more efficient robotics designs.
A Unified Framework for Rethinking Policy Divergence Measures in GRPO
Reinforcement Learning with Verified Reward (RLVR) has emerged as a critical paradigm for advancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Most existing RLVR methods, such as GRPO and its variants, ensure stable updates by constraining policy divergence through clipping likelihood ratios. This paper introduces a unified clipping framework that characterizes existing methods via a general notion of policy divergence, encompassing both likelihood ratios and Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergences and extending to alternative measures. The framework provides a principled foundation for systematically analyzing how different policy divergence measures affect exploration and performance. We further identify the KL3 estimator, a variance-reduced Monte Carlo estimator of the KL divergence, as a key policy divergence constraint. We theoretically demonstrate that the KL3-based constraint is mathematically equivalent to an asymmetric ratio-based clipping that reallocates probability mass toward high-confidence actions, promoting stronger exploration while retaining the simplicity of GRPO-style methods. Empirical results on mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that incorporating the KL3 estimator into GRPO improves both training stability and final performance, highlighting the importance of principled policy divergence constraints in policy optimization.