Christopher Summerfield
Publications
AI systems out-persuade expert humans
Many societal decisions are settled by contests of persuasion. Conversational AI is a powerful new entrant in these contests, but whether it can out-persuade skilled and highly incentivized humans has remained unclear. Here, in a series of four preregistered experiments (n = 18,978 conversations from 6,923 people), we pitted AI systems against a range of human persuaders, including laypeople, winners of a separately preregistered four-round online persuasion tournament, professional canvassers, and world championship debaters. We found that AI systems were reliably more persuasive than expert humans, even when expert humans chose their issues, researched in advance, underwent hours of live, structured practice, and were incentivized with £1,000 cash bonuses. In a follow-up study, AI's advantage persisted after experts received a coaching tool that let them practice against the AI that beat them, review their performance history, and see what AI would have said at key moments. We found converging evidence that AI's advantage stemmed from rapidly deploying larger quantities of information: after coaching, expert humans could tie an AI constrained to respond at human speeds and with human-length messages. In a final study, we show that AI's advantage extends to consequential real-world behavior: AI was nearly 3x more effective than professional canvassers from a UK fundraising firm at raising real-money donations to Save the Children. Together, these results establish that frontier AI systems out-persuade expert humans in conversation, with significant implications for political communication.
Reason to Play: Behavioral and Brain Alignment Between Frontier LRMs and Human Game Learners
Humans rapidly learn abstract knowledge when encountering novel environments and flexibly deploy this knowledge to guide efficient and intelligent action. Can modern AI systems learn and plan in a similar way? We study this question using a dataset of complex human gameplay with concurrent fMRI recordings, in which participants learn novel video games that require rule discovery, hypothesis revision, and multi-step planning. We jointly evaluate models by their ability to play the games, match human learning behavior, and predict brain activity during the same task, comparing a suite of frontier Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) against model-free and model-based deep reinforcement learning agents and a Bayesian theory-based agent. We find that frontier LRMs most closely match human behavioral patterns during game discovery and predict brain activity an order of magnitude better than both reinforcement learning alternatives across cortical and subcortical regions, with effects robust to permutation controls. Through targeted manipulations, we further show that brain alignment reflects the model's in-context representation of the game state rather than its downstream planning or reasoning. Our results establish LRMs as compelling computational accounts of human learning and decision making in complex, naturalistic environments. Project page with interactive replays: https://botcs.github.io/reason-to-play/
Post-training makes large language models less human-like
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as surrogates for human participants, but it remains unclear which models best capture human behavior and why. To address this, we introduce Psych-201, a novel dataset that enables us to measure behavioral alignment at scale. We find that post-training -- the stage that turns base models into useful assistants -- consistently reduces alignment with human behavior across model families, sizes, and objectives. Moreover, this misalignment widens in newer model generations even as base models continue to improve. Finally, we find that persona-induction -- a popular technique for eliciting human-like behavior by conditioning models on participant-specific information -- does not improve predictions at the level of individuals. Taken together, our results suggest that the very processes that are currently employed to turn LLMs into useful assistants also make them less accurate models of human behavior.
One-shot emergency psychiatric triage across 15 frontier AI chatbots
AI chatbots are increasingly used for health advice, but their performance in psychiatric triage remains undercharacterized. Psychiatric triage is particularly challenging because urgency must often be inferred from thoughts, behavior, and context rather than from objective findings. We evaluated the performance of 15 frontier AI chatbots on psychiatric triage from realistic single-message disclosures using 112 clinical vignettes, each paired with 1 of 4 original benchmark triage labels: A, routine; B, assessment within 1 week; C, assessment within 24 to 48 hours; and D, emergency care now. Vignettes covered 9 psychiatric presentation clusters and 9 focal risk dimensions, organized into 28 presentation-by-risk groups. Each group contributed 4 distinct vignettes, with 1 vignette at each triage level. Each vignette was rendered as a realistic human-authored conversational query, and the AI chatbots were tasked with assigning a triage label from that disclosure. Emergency under-triage occurred in 23 of 410 level D trials (5.6%), and all under-triaged emergencies were reassigned to level C urgency. Across target models, average accuracy ranged from 42.0% to 71.8%. Accuracy was highest for level D vignettes (94.3%) and lowest for level B vignettes (19.7%). Mean signed ordinal error was positive (+0.47 triage levels), indicating net over-triage. Dispersion was highest around the middle triage levels. All results were confirmed relative to clinician consensus labels from 50 medical doctors. When presented with user messages containing sufficient clinical information, frontier AI chatbots thus recognized psychiatric emergencies as requiring urgent medical assessment with near-zero error rates, yet showed marked over-triage for low and intermediate risk presentations.
Artificial intelligence can persuade people to take political actions
There is substantial concern about the ability of advanced artificial intelligence to influence people's behaviour. A rapidly growing body of research has found that AI can produce large persuasive effects on people's attitudes, but whether AI can persuade people to take consequential real-world actions has remained unclear. In two large preregistered experiments N=17,950 responses from 14,779 people), we used conversational AI models to persuade participants on a range of attitudinal and behavioural outcomes, including signing real petitions and donating money to charity. We found sizable AI persuasion effects on these behavioural outcomes (e.g. +19.7 percentage points on petition signing). However, we observed no evidence of a correlation between AI persuasion effects on attitudes and behaviour. Moreover, we replicated prior findings that information provision drove effects on attitudes, but found no such evidence for our behavioural outcomes. In a test of eight behavioural persuasion strategies, all outperformed the most effective attitudinal persuasion strategy, but differences among the eight were small. Taken together, these results suggest that previous findings relying on attitudinal outcomes may generalize poorly to behaviour, and therefore risk substantially mischaracterizing the real-world behavioural impact of AI persuasion.
Ask don't tell: Reducing sycophancy in large language models
Sycophancy, the tendency of large language models to favour user-affirming responses over critical engagement, has been identified as an alignment failure, particularly in high-stakes advisory and social contexts. While prior work has documented conversational features correlated with sycophancy, we lack a systematic understanding of what provokes or prevents AI sycophancy. Here, we present a set of controlled experimental studies where we first isolate how input framing influences sycophancy, and second, leverage these findings to develop mitigation strategies. In a nested factorial design, we compare questions to various non-questions where we vary three orthogonal factors: epistemic certainty (statement, belief, conviction), perspective (I- vs user-perspective), and affirmation vs negation. We show that (1) sycophancy is substantially higher in response to non-questions compared to questions. Additionally, we find that (2) sycophancy increases monotonically with epistemic certainty conveyed by the user, and (3) is amplified by I-perspective framing. Building on this, we show that asking a model to convert non-questions into questions before answering significantly reduces sycophancy. Importantly, this effect is stronger than a simple baseline prompt asking models "not to be sycophantic". Our work offers a practical and effective input-level mitigation that both developers and users can easily adopt.
When Do LLM Preferences Predict Downstream Behavior?
Preference-driven behavior in LLMs may be a necessary precondition for AI misalignment such as sandbagging: models cannot strategically pursue misaligned goals unless their behavior is influenced by their preferences. Yet prior work has typically prompted models explicitly to act in specific ways, leaving unclear whether observed behaviors reflect instruction-following capabilities vs underlying model preferences. Here we test whether this precondition for misalignment is present. Using entity preferences as a behavioral probe, we measure whether stated preferences predict downstream behavior in five frontier LLMs across three domains: donation advice, refusal behavior, and task performance. Conceptually replicating prior work, we first confirm that all five models show highly consistent preferences across two independent measurement methods. We then test behavioral consequences in a simulated user environment. We find that all five models give preference-aligned donation advice. All five models also show preference-correlated refusal patterns when asked to recommend donations, refusing more often for less-preferred entities. All preference-related behaviors that we observe here emerge without instructions to act on preferences. Results for task performance are mixed: on a question-answering benchmark (BoolQ), two models show small but significant accuracy differences favoring preferred entities; one model shows the opposite pattern; and two models show no significant relationship. On complex agentic tasks, we find no evidence of preference-driven performance differences. While LLMs have consistent preferences that reliably predict advice-giving behavior, these preferences do not consistently translate into downstream task performance.