Tzeh Yuan Neoh
Publications
Online Allocation with Unknown Shared Supply
Many real-world resource allocation systems, such as humanitarian logistics and vaccine distribution, must preposition limited supply across multiple locations before demand is realized while stockouts incur irreversible service losses. To study this, we introduce the Online Shared Supply Allocation (OSSA) problem, a stateful online model in which a central hub allocates a finite, unknown supply to multiple sites facing sequential demand under fixed-charge transportation costs and lost-sales penalties. Unlike classical make-to-stock or make-to-order inventory models, OSSA precludes backlogging and replenishment only hedges against future demand. To tackle OSSA, we propose a deterministic threshold-proportional policy GPA and prove that it achieves a $4/3$-approximation to the offline optimum up to an additive term independent of the total supply. We complement this with matching lower bounds showing that the $4/3$ ratio is tight and that the additive-error dependence is unavoidable, even for randomized algorithms that know the total supply upfront. Finally, we develop a learning-augmented extension to GPA that principally incorporates imperfect forecasts (e.g., from human experts or ML models) commonly available in practice, enabling us to exploit high-quality advice while being robust against arbitrary bad ones. Synthetic and real-world experiments show that GPA outperforms natural baselines with global supply is scarce.
Incentive-Aware AI Safety via Strategic Resource Allocation: A Stackelberg Security Games Perspective
As AI systems grow more capable and autonomous, ensuring their safety and reliability requires not only model-level alignment but also strategic oversight of the humans and institutions involved in their development and deployment. Existing safety frameworks largely treat alignment as a static optimization problem (e.g., tuning models to desired behavior) while overlooking the dynamic, adversarial incentives that shape how data are collected, how models are evaluated, and how they are ultimately deployed. We propose a new perspective on AI safety grounded in Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs): a class of game-theoretic models designed for adversarial resource allocation under uncertainty. By viewing AI oversight as a strategic interaction between defenders (auditors, evaluators, and deployers) and attackers (malicious actors, misaligned contributors, or worst-case failure modes), SSGs provide a unifying framework for reasoning about incentive design, limited oversight capacity, and adversarial uncertainty across the AI lifecycle. We illustrate how this framework can inform (1) training-time auditing against data/feedback poisoning, (2) pre-deployment evaluation under constrained reviewer resources, and (3) robust multi-model deployment in adversarial environments. This synthesis bridges algorithmic alignment and institutional oversight design, highlighting how game-theoretic deterrence can make AI oversight proactive, risk-aware, and resilient to manipulation.
The Cost of EFX: Generalized-Mean Welfare and Complexity Dichotomies with Few Surplus Items
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a central fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods, yet its existence is unresolved in general. In the setting with few surplus items, where the number of goods exceeds the number of agents by a small constant (at most three), EFX allocations are guaranteed to exist, shifting the focus from existence to efficiency and computation. We study how EFX interacts with generalized-mean ($p$-mean) welfare, which subsumes commonly-studied utilitarian ($p=1$), Nash ($p=0$), and egalitarian ($p \rightarrow -\infty$) objectives. We establish sharp complexity dichotomies at $p=0$: for any fixed $p \in (0,1]$, both deciding whether EFX can attain the global $p$-mean optimum and computing an EFX allocation maximizing $p$-mean welfare are NP-hard, even with at most three surplus goods; in contrast, for any fixed $p \leq 0$, we give polynomial-time algorithms that optimize $p$-mean welfare within the space of EFX allocations and efficiently certify when EFX attains the global optimum. We further quantify the welfare loss of enforcing EFX via the price of fairness framework, showing that for $p > 0$, the loss can grow linearly with the number of agents, whereas for $p \leq 0$, it is bounded by a constant depending on the surplus (and for Nash welfare it vanishes asymptotically). Finally we show that requiring Pareto-optimality alongside EFX is NP-hard (and becomes $Σ_2^P$-complete for a stronger variant of EFX). Overall, our results delineate when EFX is computationally costly versus structurally aligned with welfare maximization in the setting with few surplus items.