Davin Choo
Publications
Incentive-Aware AI Safety via Strategic Resource Allocation: A Stackelberg Security Games Perspective
As AI systems grow more capable and autonomous, ensuring their safety and reliability requires not only model-level alignment but also strategic oversight of the humans and institutions involved in their development and deployment. Existing safety frameworks largely treat alignment as a static optimization problem (e.g., tuning models to desired behavior) while overlooking the dynamic, adversarial incentives that shape how data are collected, how models are evaluated, and how they are ultimately deployed. We propose a new perspective on AI safety grounded in Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs): a class of game-theoretic models designed for adversarial resource allocation under uncertainty. By viewing AI oversight as a strategic interaction between defenders (auditors, evaluators, and deployers) and attackers (malicious actors, misaligned contributors, or worst-case failure modes), SSGs provide a unifying framework for reasoning about incentive design, limited oversight capacity, and adversarial uncertainty across the AI lifecycle. We illustrate how this framework can inform (1) training-time auditing against data/feedback poisoning, (2) pre-deployment evaluation under constrained reviewer resources, and (3) robust multi-model deployment in adversarial environments. This synthesis bridges algorithmic alignment and institutional oversight design, highlighting how game-theoretic deterrence can make AI oversight proactive, risk-aware, and resilient to manipulation.
Policy-Embedded Graph Expansion: Networked HIV Testing with Diffusion-Driven Network Samples
HIV is a retrovirus that attacks the human immune system and can lead to death without proper treatment. In collaboration with the WHO and Wits University, we study how to improve the efficiency of HIV testing with the goal of eventual deployment, directly supporting progress toward UN Sustainable Development Goal 3.3. While prior work has demonstrated the promise of intelligent algorithms for sequential, network-based HIV testing, existing approaches rely on assumptions that are impractical in our real-world implementations. Here, we study sequential testing on incrementally revealed disease networks and introduce Policy-Embedded Graph Expansion (PEGE), a novel framework that directly embeds a generative distribution over graph expansions into the decision-making policy rather than attempting explicit topological reconstruction. We further propose Dynamics-Driven Branching (DDB), a diffusion-based graph expansion model that supports decision making in PEGE and is designed for data-limited settings where forest structures arise naturally, as in our real-world referral process. Experiments on real HIV transmission networks show that the combined approach (PEGE + DDB) consistently outperforms existing baselines (e.g., 13% improvement in discounted reward and 9% more HIV detections with 25% of the population tested) and explore key tradeoffs that drive decision quality.