Cheol Woo Kim
Publications
Generating Robust Portfolios of Optimization Models using Large Language Models
Mathematical optimization is a powerful tool for structured decision-making across domains such as resource allocation and planning. Formulating optimization models faithful to reality, though, remains a significant bottleneck as it typically demands both domain expertise and optimization knowledge that are often scarce. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) promise to bridge this gap, enabling the generation of candidate optimization models from natural language descriptions. However, there is no guarantee that any single LLM-generated model is reliable, and existing approaches that output only one model are therefore risky. In this work, we propose a novel algorithm that generates a portfolio of optimization models, designed to be robust to the limitations of LLMs. Our method exploits the observation that a single LLM can play two distinct roles $\unicode{x2014}$ as a stochastic generator and as a reasoning evaluator $\unicode{x2014}$ and proposes a unified framework that leverages both capabilities in a complementary manner. We provide theoretical guarantees showing that, as long as either the generator or the evaluator is well-aligned with human preferences, the portfolio is guaranteed to contain high-quality candidates, enabling a principled human-in-the-loop process in which a decision-maker can review multiple candidates before committing to one. We further validate our approach empirically, demonstrating strong performance across a range of optimization modeling tasks.
Many Preferences, Few Policies: Towards Scalable Language Model Personalization
The holy grail of LLM personalization is a single LLM for each user, perfectly aligned with that user's preferences. However, maintaining a separate LLM per user is impractical due to constraints on compute, memory, and system complexity. We address this challenge by developing a principled method for selecting a small portfolio of LLMs that captures representative behaviors across heterogeneous users. We model user preferences across multiple traits (e.g., safety, humor, brevity) through a multi-dimensional weight vector. Given reward functions across these dimensions, our algorithm PALM (Portfolio of Aligned LLMs) generates a small portfolio of LLMs such that, for any weight vector, the portfolio contains a near-optimal LLM for the corresponding scalarized objective. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that provides theoretical guarantees on both the size and approximation quality of LLM portfolios for personalization. It characterizes the trade-off between system cost and personalization, as well as the diversity of LLMs required to cover the landscape of user preferences. We provide empirical results that validate these guarantees and demonstrate greater output diversity over common baselines.
Incentive-Aware AI Safety via Strategic Resource Allocation: A Stackelberg Security Games Perspective
As AI systems grow more capable and autonomous, ensuring their safety and reliability requires not only model-level alignment but also strategic oversight of the humans and institutions involved in their development and deployment. Existing safety frameworks largely treat alignment as a static optimization problem (e.g., tuning models to desired behavior) while overlooking the dynamic, adversarial incentives that shape how data are collected, how models are evaluated, and how they are ultimately deployed. We propose a new perspective on AI safety grounded in Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs): a class of game-theoretic models designed for adversarial resource allocation under uncertainty. By viewing AI oversight as a strategic interaction between defenders (auditors, evaluators, and deployers) and attackers (malicious actors, misaligned contributors, or worst-case failure modes), SSGs provide a unifying framework for reasoning about incentive design, limited oversight capacity, and adversarial uncertainty across the AI lifecycle. We illustrate how this framework can inform (1) training-time auditing against data/feedback poisoning, (2) pre-deployment evaluation under constrained reviewer resources, and (3) robust multi-model deployment in adversarial environments. This synthesis bridges algorithmic alignment and institutional oversight design, highlighting how game-theoretic deterrence can make AI oversight proactive, risk-aware, and resilient to manipulation.