Tianxing He
Publications
Can Large Language Models Reinvent Foundational Algorithms?
LLMs have shown strong potential to advance scientific discovery. Whether they possess the capacity for foundational innovation, however, remains an open question. In this work, we focus on a prerequisite for foundational innovation: can LLMs reinvent foundational algorithms in computer science? Our \textit{Unlearn-and-Reinvent} pipeline applies LLM unlearning to remove a specific foundational algorithm, such as Dijkstra's or Euclid's algorithm, from an LLM's pretrained knowledge, and then tests whether the model can reinvent it in a controlled environment. To enable effective unlearning, we adopt a GRPO-based, on-policy unlearning method. Across 10 target algorithms, 3 strong open-weight models, and 3 hint levels, our experiments demonstrate that (1) the strongest model Qwen3-4B-Thinking-2507 successfully reinvents 50% of the algorithms with no hint, 70% at hint level 1, and 90% at hint level 2; (2) a few high-level hints can enhance the reinvention success rate, but even step-by-step hints fail for those complicated algorithms; and (3) test-time reinforcement learning enables successful reinvention for the Strassen algorithm at hint level 2. Through analyses of output trajectories and ablation studies, we find that generative verifier in the reinvention phase plays a critical role in sustaining models' reasoning strength, helping to avoid the ``thought collapse'' phenomenon. These findings offer insights into both the potential and current limits of LLMs' innovative thinking.
CREBench: Evaluating Large Language Models in Cryptographic Binary Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering (RE) is central to software security, particularly for cryptographic programs that handle sensitive data and are highly prone to vulnerabilities. It supports critical tasks such as vulnerability discovery and malware analysis. Despite its importance, RE remains labor-intensive and requires substantial expertise, making large language models (LLMs) a potential solution for automating the process. However, their capabilities for RE remain systematically underexplored. To address this gap, we study the cryptographic binary RE capabilities of LLMs and introduce CREBench, a benchmark comprising 432 challenges built from 48 standard cryptographic algorithms, 3 insecure crypto key usage scenarios, and 3 difficulty levels. Each challenge follows a Capture-the-Flag (CTF) RE challenge, requiring the model to analyze the underlying cryptographic logic and recover the correct input. We design an evaluation framework comprising four sub-tasks, from algorithm identification to correct flag recovery. We evaluate eight frontier LLMs on CREBench. GPT-5.4, the best-performing model, achieves 64.03 out of 100 and recovers the flag in 59\% of challenges. We also establish a strong human expert baseline of 92.19 points, showing that humans maintain an advantage in cryptographic RE tasks. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/wangyu-ovo/CREBench.
Reverse-Engineering Model Editing on Language Models
Large language models (LLMs) are pretrained on corpora containing trillions of tokens and, therefore, inevitably memorize sensitive information. Locate-then-edit methods, as a mainstream paradigm of model editing, offer a promising solution by modifying model parameters without retraining. However, in this work, we reveal a critical vulnerability of this paradigm: the parameter updates inadvertently serve as a side channel, enabling attackers to recover the edited data. We propose a two-stage reverse-engineering attack named \textit{KSTER} (\textbf{K}ey\textbf{S}paceRecons\textbf{T}ruction-then-\textbf{E}ntropy\textbf{R}eduction) that leverages the low-rank structure of these updates. First, we theoretically show that the row space of the update matrix encodes a ``fingerprint" of the edited subjects, enabling accurate subject recovery via spectral analysis. Second, we introduce an entropy-based prompt recovery attack that reconstructs the semantic context of the edit. Extensive experiments on multiple LLMs demonstrate that our attacks can recover edited data with high success rates. Furthermore, we propose \textit{subspace camouflage}, a defense strategy that obfuscates the update fingerprint with semantic decoys. This approach effectively mitigates reconstruction risks without compromising editing utility. Our code is available at https://github.com/reanatom/EditingAtk.git.